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READING THE STANDING TEA LEAVES IN AMERICAN
ELECTRIC POWER CO. V. CONNECTICUT
Bradford C. Mank *
The U.S. Supreme Court by an equally divided vote of
four to four affirmed the Second Circuit's decision finding
standing and jurisdiction in the case in American Electric
Power Co. v. Connecticut. While not binding as precedent
beyond the Second Circuit, the case offers clues to how the
Court is likely to rule in future standing cases. This article
discusses the likely identities of the four Justices on each
side of the standing issue in the case, as well as how Justice
Sotomayor might have voted if she had not recused herself.
Furthermore, the article examines how the decision expand-
ed on the standing analysis in Massachusetts v. EPA, which
recognized special standing rights for states suing as parens
patrie to protect their state's natural resources or the health
of their citizens. State suits are likely to be an important ve-
hicle for litigating climate change cases and the decision in
American Electric casts light on how the Court will handle
these types of cases in the future.
I. INTRODUCTION
In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut ("AEP"),' eight
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously concluded that
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (the "EPA") authori-
ty to regulate greenhouse gases ("GHGs") pursuant to the Clean
* James Helmer, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College. J.D., 1987,
Yale University; A.B., 1983, Harvard University.
I thank Michael Solimine for his comments. This article will be presented at the Uni-
versity of Cincinnati College of Law Summer Scholarship Program and the Second Annual
Vermont Law School Environmental Scholarship Symposium. All errors or omissions are
my responsibility. This article is one of a series of explorations of possible extensions of
modern standing doctrines.
1. 564 U.S. -, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
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Air Act,2 which the Court recognized in its 2007 decision in Mas-
sachusetts v. EPA,' "displace[s] any federal common law right to
seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired
power plants."4 Thus, the AEP decision endorsed the Massachu-
setts decision's interpretation of the Clean Air Act to include regu-
lation of GHGs, stating that it "speaks directly to emissions of
carbon dioxide from the defendants' plants."' Justice Sonia So-
tomayor recused herself from hearing the AEP case because she
sat on the three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit that heard the case below, although she was ap-
pointed to the Supreme Court before the Second Circuit actually
decided the case.' Her absence was crucial to the Supreme Court's
decision regarding standing and jurisdiction in the case. The
Court, by an equally divided vote of four to four, affirmed the Se-
cond Circuit's decision finding standing and jurisdiction in the
7
case.
In virtually all cases involving a tie vote, the Supreme Court
simply announces: "The judgment is affirmed by an equally divid-
ed Court."' Even though it did not announce the identities of the
Justices who voted for or against standing, the AEP decision took
the unusual step of providing some explanation for how the Court
divided on the standing question, and, as a result, provided im-
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006). EPA has commenced a rulemaking under § 111 of
the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 741, to set limits on greenhouse gas emissions from new, modified,
and existing fossil-fuel fired power plants. Pursuant to a settlement finalized in March
2011, the EPA has committed to issuing a proposed rule by July 2011, and a final rule by
May 2012. Am. Electric Power, 564 U.S. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2533.
3. 549 U.S. 497, 528-29 (2007).
4. Am. Elec. Power, 564 U.S. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2537-40.
5. Id. at -, 131 S. Ct. at 2537. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote a con-
curring opinion observing that none of the parties had questioned that "the interpretation
of the Clean Air Act ... adopted by the majority in Massachusetts ... is correct." Id. at
, 131 S. Ct. 2540-41 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
6. Id. at -, 131 S. Ct. at 2540 (stating that Justice Sotomayor did not participate in
the consideration or decision of the case); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8 n.1, Am.
Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. - (2011) (No. 10-174) [hereinafter Cert Peti-
tion] ('The original panel [on the Second Circuit] included then-Judge Sotomayor, who was
appointed to the Supreme Court on August 8, 2009, before the panel opinion issued.").
7. Am. Elec. Power, 564 U.S. at _,131 S. Ct. at 2535 & n.6.
8. E.g., Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U. S. , -, 131 S. Ct. 2312, 2313 (2011)
(per curiam); Brendan Koerner, What Happens in a Supreme Court Tie?, SLATE (Nov. 2,
2004, 4:46 PM), http://www.slate.comlarticles/news and-politics/explainer/2004/11/whatL
happens-inascotustie.html ("Tradition holds that the court's per curiam opinion in such
ties is usually very, very terse, often consisting of no more than a single sentence: 'The
judgment is affirmed by an equally divided court."').
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portant information about the positions of the Justices on the is-
sue.' While it is not binding as a decision for the lower courts ex-
cept for the Second Circuit,o the four to four affirmance of the Se-
cond Circuit's standing decision provides important clues on how
the Court is likely to rule in future standing cases. This article
will discuss the likely identity of the Justices on each side of the
standing issue in AEP. Furthermore, the article will speculate re-
garding how Justice Sotomayor might have voted in the case if
she had not recused herself.
Implicitly, the AEP decision reaffirmed and even expanded its
standing analysis in Massachusetts, which recognized that states
have special standing rights when they sue as parens patriae to
protect their state's natural resources or the health of their citi-
zens." AEP arguably adopted an even broader standing analysis
than Massachusetts by eliminating the requirement of a statutory
procedural right as a basis for standing. 2 State standing is im-
portant because state attorney generals are involved in many dif-
ferent kinds of suits in federal courts." In particular, state suits
are likely to be significant in future climate change cases if states
file state common law nuisance claims or challenges to EPA regu-
lations relating to GHGs."
9. Am. Elec. Power, 564 U.S. at_, 131 S. Ct. at 2535.
10. Michael B. Gerrard, 'American Electric Power' Leaves Open Many Questions for
Climate Litigation, N.Y. L.J., July 14, 2011, available at http://www.arnoldporter.com/res
ources/documents/Arnold&PorterLLPNewYorkLawJournalGerrard_7.14.11.pdf (stating
that the standing portion of the AEP case "did not set precedent in the technical sense");
Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Warming an EPA Worry, at First, SCOTUSBLOG (June
20, 2011, 1:31 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/06/opinion-analysis-warming-an-epa-
worry-at-first ("Because the [AEPJ Court split 4-4 on the right to sue issue, that part of the
Second Circuit decision was left intact, but without setting a nationwide precedent.").
11. See infra Parts III, VI.D., and VII.
12. See infra Parts III, VI.D., and VII.
13. Bradford C. Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights than Ordinary
Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA's New Standing Test for States, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1701, 1780-84 (2008) [hereinafter Mank, States Standing] (discussing role of state attor-
neys general in possible parens patriae cases).
14. See infra Parts VI.D and VII.
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II. STANDING BASICS' 5
A. Constitutional Standing
Although the Constitution does not explicitly require a plaintiff
possess "standing" to file suit in federal courts, since 1944 the
Supreme Court has inferred from the Constitution's Article III
limitation of judicial decisions to "Cases" and "Controversies" that
federal courts must utilize standing requirements to guarantee
that the plaintiff has a genuine interest and stake in a case.16 The
federal courts have jurisdiction over a case only if at least one
15. The discussion of standing in Part I relies upon my earlier standing articles: Brad-
ford C. Mank, Informational Standing After Summers, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2011) (on file with author) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?Ab
stract id=1825307 [hereinafter Mank, Informational Standing After Summers]; Bradford
C. Mank, Revisiting the Lyons Den: Summers v. Earth Island Institute's Misuse of Lyons's
"Realistic Threat" of Harm Standing Test, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 837, 837-44 (2010); Mank,
States Standing, supra note 13; Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Future Generations:
Does Massachusetts v. EPA Open Standing for Generations to Come?, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 1, 4-5 (2009) [hereinafter Mank, Standing and Future Generations]; Bradford C. Mank,
Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 1 (2005)
[hereinafter Mank, Global Warming]; Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Statistical Per-
sons: A Risk-Based Approach to Standing, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 665, 672-73 (2009) [hereinaf-
ter Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons]; Bradford C. Mank, Standing in Monsanto
Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms: Using Economic Injury as a Basis for Standing When Envi-
ronmental Harm is Difficult to Prove, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 307, 307-15 (2010); Bradford
C. Mank, Summers v. Earth Island Institute: Its Implications for Future Standing Deci-
sions, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10958, 10958-59 (2010); Bradford C. Mank, Summers v. Earth
Island Institute Rejects Probabilistic Standing, but a 'Realistic Threat" of Harm Is a Better
Standing Test, 40 ENvTL. L. 89, 91-97 (2010).
16. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2. It states in pertinent part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising un-
der this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambas-
sadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be
a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State
and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States;-
between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citi-
zens or Subjects.
See also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340-42 (2006) (explaining why the
Supreme Court infers that Article III's case and controversy requirement necessitates
standing limitations); Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944) (stating explicitly the
Article III standing requirement in a Supreme Court case for the first time); Mank, States
Standing, supra note 13, at 1709-10. But see Am. Bottom Conservancy v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng'rs, 650 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2011) (questioning whether standing is based on Article
III requirements and citing academic literature). See generally Michael E. Solimine, Con-
gress, Separation of Powers and Standing, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1023, 1036-38 (2009)
(discussing the debate as to whether the Constitution implicitly requires standing to sue).
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plaintiff can prove standing for each form of relief sought." A fed-
eral court must dismiss a case without deciding the merits if the
plaintiff fails to meet the constitutional standing test."
Standing requirements are related to broader constitutional
principles. Standing doctrine prohibits unconstitutional advisory
opinions." Furthermore, standing requirements support separa-
tion of powers principles defining the division of powers between
the judiciary and political branches of government so that the
"Federal Judiciary respects 'the proper-and properly limited-
role of the courts in a democratic society."'20 There is disagree-
ment, however, regarding to what extent separation of powers
principles limit the authority of Congress to authorize standing
for private citizens challenging alleged executive branch under-
enforcement or non-enforcement of statutorily mandated re-
quirements."
For constitutional standing, the Court has used a three-part
standing test that requires a plaintiff to show that: (1) she has
"suffered an injury-in-fact," which is (a) "concrete and particular-
ized" and (b) "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothet-
ical"; (2) "there [is] a causal connection between the injury and
the conduct complained of-the injury has to be fairly ...
trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ...
th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not be-
fore the court"; and (3) "it [is] likely, as opposed to merely specu-
17. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351-54; Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) ("[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately
for each form of relief sought.").
18. See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 339-43; Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180
("[We have an obligation to assure ourselves that [petitioner] had Article III standing at
the outset of the litigation.").
19. See DaiimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 340-42; Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S.
11, 23-24 (1998).
20. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 341 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750
(1984)).
21. See Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L REV. 459, 496 (2008)
(arguing courts should not use standing doctrine as "a backdoor way to limit Congress's
legislative power"). Compare Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-78 (1992)
(concluding Article III and Article II of the Constitution limit Congress's authority to au-
thorize citizen suits by any person lacking a concrete injury), with id. at 602 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the "principal effect" of Justice Scalia's majority opinion's re-
strictive approach to standing was "to transfer power into the hands of the Executive at
the expense-not of the courts-but of Congress, from which that power originates and
emanates").
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lative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.""
A plaintiff has the burden of establishing all three prongs of the
standing test. 23
B. Prudential Standing and Generalized Grievances
In addition to constitutional Article III standing requirements,
federal courts may impose prudential standing requirements to
limit unreasonable demands on limited judicial resources or for
other judicial policy reasons." Congress may enact legislation to
override prudential limitations, but must "expressly negate[]"
such limitations." Requiring express statutory language to over-
ride the Court's prudential standing rules probably does not de-
mand the extraordinary specificity necessitated by a clear state-
ment rule of statutory construction.
The Supreme Court has been unclear regarding whether its re-
striction on suits alleging "generalized grievances,"" a term which
courts sometimes use to refer to suits involving large segments of
the public or to suits where a citizen who has suffered no personal
injury seeks to force the government to obey a duly enacted law,
is a prudential limitation or a constitutional one.28 In Duke Power
22. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 342 (stating that parties asserting federal jurisdic-
tion must "carry the burden of establishing their standing under Article III"); Lujan, 504
U.S. at 561 (stating also that parties asserting federal jurisdiction must carry the burden
of establishing standing under Article III); LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 336 (3d
ed. 2009).
24. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162-63 (1997) (describing the "zone of
interests" standard as a "prudential limitation" rather than a mandatory constitutional
requirement); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) (stating that prudential requirements
are based "in policy, rather than purely constitutional, considerations"); YACKLE, supra
note 23, at 318 (stating that prudential limitations are policy-based "and may be relaxed
in some circumstances").
25. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162-66 (explaining that "unlike their constitutional counter-
parts, [prudential limits on standing] can be modified or abrogated by Congress," that
prudential limitations must be "expressly negated," and concluding that a citizen suit pro-
vision abrogated the zone of interest limitation).
26. YACKLE, supra note 23, at 386 & n.493.
27. Courts have failed to precisely define what constitutes a "generalized grievance."
Id. at 342 ("The generalized grievance formulation is notoriously ambiguous."); Ryan
Guilds, Comment, A Jurisprudence of Doubt: Generalized Grievances as a Limitation to
Federal Court Access, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1863, 1884-92 (1996) ("Beyond the uncertainty
about whether generalized grievances are constitutional or prudential limitations, there is
also uncertainty about their precise definition.").
28. See YACKLE, supra note 23, at 342-44 (discussing debate in the Supreme Court
regarding whether rule against generalized grievances is a constitutional rule or a non-
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Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.,2 9 for example,
the Supreme Court held that a court could deny standing in a suit
involving generalized harms to large numbers of the public be-
cause such a suit would raise "general prudential concerns 'about
the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a demo-
cratic society."'o Subsequently, however, in Public Citizen v.
United States Department of Justice, the Court rejected the ar-
gument that the plaintiffs were barred from standing because
they alleged a generalized grievance shared by many other citi-
zens. The Court stated:
The fact that other citizens or groups of citizens might make the
same complaint after unsuccessfully demanding disclosure under
[the Federal Advisory Committee Act] does not lessen appellants' as-
serted injury, any more than the fact that numerous citizens might
request the same information under the Freedom of Information Act
entails that those who have been denied access do not possess a suf-
32ficient basis to sue.
The Public Citizen decision did not mention Duke Power's rejec-
tion of suits asserting a generalized grievance shared by many
others. Because the Court has never precisely defined the term
"generalized grievance," nor decided whether the bar against
them is either a flexible judicial prudential doctrine or a firmer
constitutional rule, it is difficult to decide whether the Public Cit-
izen and Duke Power decisions are merely in tension with each
other or actually inappropriate."
In Federal Election Commission v. Akins," the government ar-
gued that the plaintiffs, who sought information from the Federal
Election Commission because the information allegedly could as-
sist their voting decisions, did not have standing because they
had suffered only a generalized grievance common to all other
constitutional policy waivable by Congress); Mank, States Standing, supra note 13, at
1710-15 (discussing confusion over whether the Court's standing cases prohibiting gener-
alized grievances are constitutional or prudential limitations); Solimine, supra note 16, at
1027 & n.14 (same); Guilds, supra note 27, at 1875-84 (same).
29. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
30. Id. at 80 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
31. 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
32. Id. at 449-50.
33. See id. at 440-89.
34. See YACKLE, supra note 23, at 342 ("The generalized grievance formulation is no-
toriously ambiguous."); Solimine, supra note 16, at 1027 ("The Court .. . has not been clear
... whether the barrier to bringing such cases is a constitutional or prudential one.").
35. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
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voters." The Court rejected the government's arguments that the
informational injury to the plaintiffs was too abstract or general-
ized to constitute a concrete injury or that it violated judicially
imposed prudential norms because the statute specifically author-
ized the right of voters to request information from the Commis-
sion and, therefore, overrode any prudential standing limitations
against generalized grievances." The Court distinguished prior
cases that had enforced judicially imposed prudential norms
against generalized grievances by reasoning that it would deny
standing for generalized injuries only if the harm is both widely
shared and also of "an abstract and indefinite nature-for exam-
ple, harm to the 'common concern for obedience to law."'" Akins
stated that Article III standing was permissible even if many
people suffered similar injuries as long as those injuries were
concrete and not abstract." The Court declared that the fact that
"an injury is widely shared ... does not, by itself, automatically
disqualify an interest for Article III purposes. Such an interest,
where sufficiently concrete, may count as an 'injury in fact."'o Ac-
cordingly, the Akins decision recognized that a plaintiff who suf-
fers a concrete actual injury may sue even though many others
have suffered similar injuries:
Thus the fact that a political forum may be more readily available
where an injury is widely shared .. . does not, by itself, automatical-
ly disqualify an interest for Article III purposes. . . . This conclusion
seems particularly obvious where (to use a hypothetical example)
large numbers of individuals suffer the same common-law injury
(say, a widespread mass tort), or where large numbers of voters suf-
41fer interference with voting rights conferred by law.
Akins' broad acceptance of suits involving widespread injuries
has not been accepted by all members of the Court. In his dissent-
ing opinion in Akins, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices O'Connor
and Thomas, argued that Article III prohibits all generalized
grievances, even ones involving concrete injuries, because plain-
36. Id. at 19.
37. Id. at 13-21; Kimberly N. Brown, What's Left Standing? FECA Citizen Suits and
the Battle for Judicial Review, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 677, 678 (2007).
38. Solimine, supra note 16, at 14. The Akins decision implied that the rule against
generalized grievances is prudential and not constitutional in nature, but did not explicitly
decide the issue. See id. at 24-25; accord Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra
note 15, at 717 (discussing Akins as treating generalized grievances as prudential rule).
39. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25.
40. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
41. Id.; accord Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 15, at 717.
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tiffs must demonstrate a "particularized" injury that "affect[s] the
plaintiff in a personal and individual way."42 He contended that
the Akins plaintiffs' alleged informational injury was an "undif-
ferentiated" generalized grievance that was "common to all mem-
bers of the public," and, therefore, that they must resolve it "by
political, rather than judicial, means."" More broadly, Justice
Scalia dissented in Akins because he argued that generalized in-
juries to a large portion of the public are inherently unsuitable for
judicial resolution and must be addressed by the political branch-
es of government and especially the executive branch under the
President's Article II authority.4 4 Similarly, as is discussed in Part
II, Chief Justice Roberts's dissenting opinion in Massachusetts,
which was joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, argued
that suits alleging that the EPA had failed to regulate carbon di-
oxide and other GHGs were generalized grievances because cli-
mate change affects everyone in the world, and, therefore, such
issues should be addressed by the political branches rather than
the federal judiciary." Furthermore, as is discussed in Part IV.B,
the acting U.S. Solicitor General in his brief for AEP argued that
the Court should utilize a prudential barrier against generalized
grievances to limit standing in climate change cases."
III. MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA: PARENS PATRIAE STATE STANDING"
In Massachusetts, the Supreme Court for the first time con-
cluded that states have greater standing rights in some circum-
stances than other litigants pursuant to the parens patriae doc-
trine." Chief Justice Roberts' dissenting opinion disagreed with
the majority's use of the parens patriae doctrine to expand the
standing rights of states.49 Additionally, Chief Justice Roberts's
42. Akins, 524 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life, 504 U.S. 555, 555 n.1 (1992)).
43. Id. (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted); accord Mank, Global Warming supra note 15, at 39.
44. Akins, 524 U.S. at 31-37; see also Brown, supra note 37, at 702-03.
45. See infra Part III.B.
46. See infra Part V.B.
47. The discussion of Massachusetts v. EPA and parens patriae state standing in Part
III is based on my earlier articles, Mank, States Standing, supra note 13, and Mank,
Standing and Future Generations, supra note 15.
48. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518-20 (2007); Mank, Standing and Future
Generations, supra note 15, at 68.
49. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 536-37 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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broader argument was that separation of powers principles pro-
hibit courts from recognizing standing for social problems that af-
fect all citizens because it is the role of the political branches to
address generalized grievances."o
A. Justice Stevens's Majority Opinion on Standing
1. Congress May Broadly Define What Constitutes an Injury
Because global warming affects everyone in the world, Chief
Justice Roberts's dissenting opinion argued that generalized inju-
ries resulting from climate change are too nonspecific to justify
individual standing rights and are better addressed through the
political process." Justice Stevens, in his Massachusetts majority
opinion, however, responded that Congress has the authority to
authorize climate change challenges if it carefully defines such
* 52
suits as constituting a concrete injury in an appropriate statute.
He quoted Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lujan v. De-
fenders of Wildlife for the principle that
"Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of
causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none ex-
isted before. . . . [Provided that Congress] identif[ies] the injury it
seeks to vindicate and relate[s] the injury to the class of persons en-
titled to bring suit."5 3
2. The Special Standing Rights of States
The Massachusetts decision used the parens patriae doctrine as
a justification for giving greater standing rights to states than
other litigants.5 4 The parens patriae doctrine developed as an
English common law doctrine regarding the authority of the Eng-
lish King to protect incompetent persons including minors, the
50. Id. at 535 ("This Court's standing jurisprudence simply recognizes that redress of
grievances of the sort at issue here 'is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive,'
not the federal courts" (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992)).
51. Id. at 535, 548-49.
52. Id. at 516 (majority opinion) ("The parties' dispute turns on the proper construc-
tion of a congressional statute, a question eminently suitable to resolution in federal court.
Congress has moreover authorized this type of challenge to EPA action. . . . That authori-
zation is of critical importance to the standing inquiry . . . .").
53. Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment)).
54. Id. at 518-20.
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mentally ill, and mentally limited persons." Since the early twen-
tieth century, federal courts have recognized that states may sue
as parens patriae to protect their quasi-sovereign interests in the
health, welfare, and natural resources of their citizens." In its
1901 decision in Missouri v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that
Missouri could request injunctive relief to enjoin Illinois from dis-
charging sewage that polluted the Mississippi River in Missouri."
The Missouri decision declared that a state could sue to protect
the health of its citizens, stating:
It is true that no question of boundary is involved, nor of direct prop-
erty rights belonging to the complainant State. But it must surely be
conceded that, if the health and comfort of the inhabitants of a State
are threatened, the State is the proper party to represent and defend
them.
The Missouri decision "relied upon an analogy to independent
countries in order to delineate those interests that a State could
pursue in federal court as parens patriae, apart from its sovereign
and proprietary interests."" The Court stated:
If Missouri were an independent and sovereign State all must admit
that she could seek a remedy by negotiation, and, that failing, by
force. Diplomatic powers and the right to make war having been sur-
rendered to the general government, it was to be expected that upon
the latter would be devolved the duty of providing a remedy and that
remedy, we think, is found in the constitutional provisions we are
considering.6o
Relying upon the parens patriae doctrine, Justice Stevens in
his Massachusetts decision stated that "the special position and
interest of Massachusetts" was important in determining stand-
55. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600
(1982); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972); Estados Unidos Mexicanos v.
DeCoster, 229 F.3d 332, 335 n.4 (1st Cir. 2000); see also Mank, States Standing, supra
note 13, at 1756-57.
56. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518-19; Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230,
237 (1907); Mank, States Standing, supra note 13, at 1757-59.
57. 180 U.S. 208, 248-49 (1901). In a subsequent case, the Court denied Missouri's
request for an injunction without prejudice because it was unclear whether the typhoid
bacillus in the sewage survived the journey from Illinois to Missouri and there was evi-
dence of possible infection in other sewage sources, including towns in Missouri, but the
Court left it open to Missouri to submit additional evidence addressing whether Illinois
was the source of the alleged disease. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 523-26 (1906).
58. Missouri, 180 U.S. at 241.
59. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 603.
60. Missouri, 180 U.S. at 241.
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ing." He declared that "[ilt is of considerable relevance that the
party seeking review here is a sovereign State and not, as it was
in Lujan, a private individual."6 2 Citing Justice Holmes's 1907
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper opinion, which authorized Georgia to
sue on behalf of its citizens to protect them from air pollution
from outside its borders because of the state's quasi-sovereign in-
terest in the state's natural resources and the health of its citi-
zens, the Massachusetts decision observed that the Court had
long ago "recognized that States are not normal litigants for the
purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction."" In Tennessee Copper,
the Court followed the Missouri decision's approach of justifying
state parens patriae suits for quasi-sovereign interests as a sub-
stitute for the sovereign interests states surrender when they join
the United States.64 Additionally, Tennessee Copper expanded the
use of parens patriae suits from protecting not only the health of
a states' citizens but also to safeguarding their land, air, and nat-
ural resources." The Tennessee Copper decision stated:
This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of quasi-
sovereign. In that capacity the State has an interest independent of
and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its
domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be
stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure
air. ... When the States by their union made the forcible abatement
of outside nuisances impossible to each, they did not thereby agree to
submit to whatever might be done. They did not renounce the possi-
bility of making reasonable demands on the ground of their still re-
maining quasi-sovereign interests; and the alternative to force is a66
suit in this court.
61. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 518-19 (citing Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)).
64. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237 (citing Missouri, 180 U.S. at 241).
65. See id.; Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions,
the Tobacco Litigation, and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859, 1867
(2000) ("In ... Tennessee Copper, a state's quasi-sovereign interest was extended beyond
the general concepts of the health and comfort of its citizens to specifically include inter-
ests in the land on which they reside and in the air that they breathe." (citing Tennessee
Copper, 206 U.S. at 237)); Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and
the Attorney General as the Guardian of the State's Natural Resources, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L.
& PoL'Y F. 57, 107-08 (2005) ("The Supreme Court, observing that the state owned very
little of the property alleged to be damaged, recast the state's claim as a suit for injury to
resources owned by Georgia in its capacity of 'quasi-sovereign."' (quoting Tenn. Copper
Co., 206 U.S. at 237)).
66. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237 (citing Missouri, 180 U.S. at 241).
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Justice Stevens concluded in the Massachusetts decision that,
"[j]ust as Georgia's independent interest 'in all the earth and air
within its domain' supported federal jurisdiction a century ago, so
too does Massachusetts' well-founded desire to preserve its sover-
eign territory today."67 Additionally, the Massachusetts court stat-
ed that "Massachusetts does in fact own a great deal of the 'terri-
tory alleged to be affected' only reinforces the conclusion that its
stake in the outcome of this case is sufficiently concrete to war-
rant the exercise of federal judicial power.""
Further explicating the parens patriae doctrine, Justice Ste-
vens explained that states had standing to protect their quasi-
sovereign interest in the health and welfare of their citizens be-
cause they had surrendered three crucial sovereign powers to the
federal government: (1) states may no longer use military force;
(2) the Constitution prohibits states from negotiating treaties
with foreign governments; and (3) federal laws may in some cir-
cumstances preempt state laws. 69 Because states had surrendered
these three sovereign powers to the federal government, the
Court invoked the parens patriae doctrine to preserve the role for
the states in a federal system of government by recognizing that
states can file suit in federal court to protect their quasi-
sovereign interest in the health, welfare, and natural resources of
their citizens.70
Justice Stevens somewhat confusingly combined the parens pa-
triae doctrine with other arguments for granting standing in
Massachusetts, including a procedural right conferred in the
Clean Air Act to challenge the EPA's decision to reject the plain-
tiffs' rulemaking petition." To support its conclusion that Massa-
chusetts had the right to sue, the Court relied upon statutory
language in the Clean Air Act to conclude that Congress had re-
quired the EPA to use the federal government's sovereign powers
to protect states, among others, from vehicle emissions "which in
[the Administrator's] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollu-
tion which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare."" Additionally, the Massachusetts decision ob-
67. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518-19 (quoting Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237).
68. Id. at 519 (quoting Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237).
69. Id.
70. See id. at 519-20.
71. Id.
72. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006)).
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served that Congress has "recognized a concomitant procedural
right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbi-
trary and capricious."" Combining these justifications for stand-
ing with the parens patriae doctrine, Justice Stevens concluded,
"[g]iven that procedural right and Massachusetts' stake in pro-
tecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the Commonwealth is enti-
tled to special solicitude in our standing analysis."74
Justice Stevens's intermingling of the parens patriae doctrine
with statutory language in the Clean Air Act would subsequently
allow the utility petitioners in AEP to argue that the special
standing rights of states applied only in statutory cases and not
common law actions." However, it is far from clear that Justice
Stevens intended to limit the Massachusetts holding to statutory
actions as four members of the Court in AEP concluded that Mas-
sachusetts supported standing for the common law suit in AEP."
The biggest problem with the Massachusetts decision is that it did
not clearly delineate to what extent the special state standing re-
sulted from the parens patriae doctrine as opposed to either stat-
utory rights in the Clean Air Act" or the special standing rights
of plaintiffs seeking to vindicate procedural rights." Because the
standing analysis in Massachusetts invoked multiple factors to
justify state standing, the parties in AEP were able to plausibly
articulate radically different views of standing before the Su-
preme Court.
73. Id. at 520 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)).
74. Id.
75. See infra Part V.A.
76. See infra Part VI.D.
77. See infra Part V.A.
78. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517-18 ("When a litigant is vested with a proce-
dural right, that litigant has standing if there is some possibility that the requested relief
will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the
litigant."); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992) (recognizing that
procedural rights plaintiffs have special rights); Mank, States Standing, supra note 13, at
1733-34, 1746-47, 1755-56 (criticizing Massachusetts for not clarifying whether and to
what extent the special treatment of state standing in the case resulted from the parens
patriae doctrine as opposed to the special standing rights of plaintiffs seeking to vindicate
procedural rights or other factors).
79. See infra Part V.
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3. Massachusetts Meets the Tests for Injury, Causation, and
Redressability
The Court concluded that the Commonwealth had met the
three-part Article III standing test for injury, causation, and re-
dressability.o Regarding the injury prong of the standing test, the
Court determined that climate change had caused rising sea lev-
els that had already harmed Massachusetts's coastline and posed
potentially more severe harms in the future." The Court found
that Massachusetts had already suffered loss of its coastline be-
cause of evidence in "petitioners' unchallenged affidavits [that]
global sea levels rose somewhere between 10 and 20 centimeters
over the 20th century as a result of global warming," and, as a
consequence, "[tihese rising seas have already begun to swallow
Massachusetts' coastal land."82 Rejecting the premise that pru-
dential or constitutional principles bar standing for any plaintiff
seeking to challenge a generalized grievance," Justice Stevens
stated "that these climate-change risks are 'widely shared' does
not minimize Massachusetts' interest in the outcome of this liti-
gation."84 Because Massachusetts "owns a substantial portion of
the state's coastal property," the Court concluded that "[the
Commonwealth] has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity
as a landowner" even if many others have suffered similar inju-
ries." Moreover, the Court determined that "[tihe severity of that
injury will only increase over the course of the next century" as
sea levels continue to rise, and that "[r]emediation costs alone,
petitioners allege, could run well into the hundreds of millions of
dollars."
Addressing the causation prong of the standing test, the Court
concluded that the "EPA does not dispute the existence of a caus-
80. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 526.
81. See id. at 521-23; see also Robin Kundis Craig, Removing 'The Cloak of a Stand-
ing Inquiry" Pollution Regulation, Public Health, and Private Risk in the Injury-in-Fact
Analysis, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 149, 195-96 (2007); Mank, Standing and Future Genera-
tions, supra note 15, at 71-73.
82. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522.
83. See supra Part II (discussing whether prudential standing or constitutional stand-
ing principles restrict or prohibit suits alleging generalized grievances).
84. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522 ("Where a harm is concrete, though widely shared,
the Court has found 'injury-in-fact."' (quoting Federal Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S.
11, 24 (1998)).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 522-23.
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al connection between manmade [GHG] emissions and global
warming."" In light of the EPA's acknowledgement that man-
made GHG emissions cause climate change, the majority opinion
determined that "[a]t a minimum, therefore, EPA's refusal to
regulate such emissions 'contributes' to Massachusetts' injuries.""
Nevertheless, the EPA "maintain[ed] that its decision not to regu-
late GHG emissions from new motor vehicles contributes so in-
significantly to petitioners' injuries that the agency cannot be
haled into federal court to answer for them" since "predicted in-
creases in [GHG] emissions from developing nations, particularly
China and India, are likely to offset any marginal domestic de-
crease" that might result if the agency regulated GHGs from new
vehicles." The Court rejected the EPA's causation argument be-
cause it "rests on the erroneous assumption that a small incre-
mental step, because it is incremental, can never be attacked in a
federal judicial forum."" Justice Stevens observed that agencies
and legislatures "do not generally resolve massive problems in
one fell regulatory swoop."" He concluded, "[t]hat a first step
might be tentative does not by itself support the notion that fed-
eral courts lack jurisdiction to determine whether that step con-
forms to law."92
Finally, the EPA similarly argued that the plaintiffs could not
satisfy the redressability portion of the standing test since federal
courts could not remedy the alleged harms to the petitioners from
GHGs because most emissions come from other countries." Re-
jecting the EPA's argument, the Court emphasized that the EPA
had a duty to reduce future harms to Massachusetts even if it
could not prevent all such harms: "While it may be true that
regulating motor-vehicle emissions will not by itself reverse global
warming, it by no means follows that we lack jurisdiction to de-
cide whether EPA has a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it. 94
Responding to the EPA's argument that its regulation of GHG
emissions from new vehicles would have little impact because of
87. Id. at 523.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 523-24.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 524.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 517, 525-26.
94. Id. at 525.
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increasing emissions from developing countries such as China
and India, the Court stated: "A reduction in domestic emissions
would slow the pace of global emissions increases, no matter what
happens elsewhere."" Furthermore, the Court suggested that the
EPA had a duty to prevent catastrophic harms to future genera-
tions: "The risk of catastrophic harm, though remote, is neverthe-
less real. That risk would be reduced to some extent if petitioners
received the relief they seek. We therefore hold that petitioners
have standing to challenge EPA's denial of their rulemaking peti-
tion."96
B. Chief Justice Roberts's Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the
global problem of climate change was a nonjusticiable general
grievance that should be decided by the political branches rather
than the federal courts." He argued that it was inappropriate for
the Court to apply a more generous standing test for states be-
cause there was no basis in the statute, precedent, or logic for
such a differentiation." Furthermore, he contended that states do
not have greater standing rights under the parens patriae doc-
trine."
1. The Parens Patriae Doctrine Does Not Provide Massachusetts
with Greater Standing Rights
Chief Justice Roberts conceded that Tennessee Copper treated
states more favorably than private litigants, but he argued that
the case did so "solely with respect to available remedies," giving
Georgia the right to equitable relief when private litigants could
obtain only a legal remedy.'0 He argued that "[t]he case had noth-
ing to do with Article III standing."' His point is technically cor-
rect because the Court did not develop the modern standing doc-
trine until the 1940s,'02 but he did not address the implication in
95. Id. at 523-26.
96. Id. at 526.
97. Id. at 535-36 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 536-40.
99. Id. at 538-39.
100. Id. at 537-38.
101. Id. at 537.
102. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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the majority opinion that broad standing rights for states would
enhance their ability to enforce their quasi-sovereign interest in
protecting the health of their citizens or their natural resources."'
Applying a narrow interpretation of the parens patriae doc-
trine, Chief Justice Roberts argued that "Tennessee Copper has
since stood for nothing more than a State's right, in an original
jurisdiction action, to sue in a representative capacity as parens
patriae," and that the parens patriae doctrine does not support
giving states greater standing rights than individuals.104 He con-
tended that "[n]othing about a State's ability to sue in that capac-
ity dilutes the bedrock requirement of showing injury, causation,
and redressability to satisfy Article III."o' Justice Stevens's ma-
jority opinion, however, did not seek to eliminate the three-part
standing test for states, although his opinion did vaguely suggest
that some portions of those three tests might be relaxed for states
representing their quasi-sovereign interests in a parens patriae
suit.o' By contrast, Chief Justice Roberts argued that a parens
patriae suit could in no way lessen a plaintiff state's obligation to
prove an injury because "[a] claim of parens patriae standing is
distinct from an allegation of direct injury" and "[f]ar from being
a substitute for Article III injury, parens patriae actions raise an
additional hurdle for a state litigant: the articulation of a 'quasi-
sovereign interest' apart from the interests of particular private
parties."o' Chief Justice Roberts contended that "a State assert-
ing quasi-sovereign interests as parens patriae must still show
that its citizens satisfy Article III" and that "[flocusing on Massa-
chusetts' interests as quasi-sovereign makes the required show-
ing here harder, not easier.""o
Chief Justice Roberts argued that the Court did not explain
how its "special solicitude" for Massachusetts affected its stand-
ing analysis "except as an implicit concession that petitioners
103. See supra text accompanying note 62.
104. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 538 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 518-26 (majority opinion) (concluding that states asserting quasi-sovereign
interests as parens patriae are entitled to a more lenient standing test, but also stating
that Commonwealth of Massachusetts met the normal three-part standing test); Mank,
States Standing, supra note 13, at 1727-34 (discussing standing analysis in Massachu-
setts).
107. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 538 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
108. Id.
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cannot establish standing on traditional terms."'9 There is some
merit to his criticism of the majority opinion because Justice Ste-
vens never clearly explained to what extent the Court used "spe-
cial solicitude" for Massachusetts's status as a state to change the
Court's standing analysis."o Chief Justice Roberts asserted that
"the status of Massachusetts as a State cannot compensate for pe-
titioners' failure to demonstrate injury in fact, causation, and re-
dressability.""' Chief Justice Roberts maintained that the peti-
tioners' injuries from global warming failed to meet Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife's requirement that the alleged injury be
"particularized" because they were common to the public at
large."'
Additionally, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the petitioners
failed to prove that a causal connection existed between the al-
leged injury of loss of coastal land in Massachusetts and "the lack
of new motor vehicle [GHG] emission standards.""' Because
GHGs persist in the atmosphere "for anywhere from 50 to 200
years" and "domestic motor vehicles contribute about 6 percent of
global carbon dioxide emissions and 4 percent of global [GHG]
emissions." He concluded: "In light of the bit-part domestic new
motor vehicle [GHG] emissions have played in what petitioners
describe as a 150-year global phenomenon, and the myriad addi-
tional factors bearing on petitioners' alleged injury-the loss of
Massachusetts coastal land-the connection is far too speculative
to establish causation."" 4 By contrast, the majority rejected simi-
lar arguments by the EPA and concluded instead that the peti-
tioners had established causation because "U.S. motor-vehicle
emissions make a meaningful contribution to greenhouse gas con-
centrations and hence, according to petitioners, to global warm-
ing." "1
Furthermore, Chief Justice Roberts argued that "[r]edressa-
bility is even more problematic" for the plaintiffs in meeting their
109. Id. at 540.
110. See Mank, States Standing, supra note 13, at 1733-34, 1746-47, 1755-56 (criticiz-
ing Massachusetts for not clarifying whether and to what extent the special treatment of
state standing in the case resulted from the parens patriae doctrine as opposed to the spe-
cial standing rights of plaintiffs seeking to vindicate procedural rights or other factors).
111. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 540 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 540-41 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
113. Id. at 543-45.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 523-25 (majority opinion).
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burden of proving standing because of the "tenuous link between
petitioners' alleged injury and the indeterminate fractional do-
mestic emissions at issue here," as well as the additional problem
that the "petitioners cannot meaningfully predict what will come
of the 80 percent of [GHG] emissions that originate outside the
United States.""16 Chief Justice Roberts rejected the majority's
conclusion that "any decrease in domestic emissions will 'slow the
pace of global emissions increases, no matter what happens else-
where.""'" He argued that the Court's reasoning failed to satisfy
the three-part standing test's requirement that a court find that
it is "likely" that a remedy will redress the "particular injury-in-
fact" at issue in that case."' Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that
"even if regulation does reduce emissions-to some indeterminate
degree, given events elsewhere in the world-the Court never ex-
plains why that makes it likely that the injury in fact-the loss of
land-will be redressed.""' By contrast, the majority was satisfied
that the petitioners had shown that the EPA's regulation of GHG
emissions from new vehicles should reduce the risk to the Massa-
chusetts coastline from rising sea levels resulting from GHGs and
higher temperatures, despite the uncertainties about how much
land the regulation would save.'20
2. Chief Justice Roberts Argues the Case is a Nonjusticiable
General Grievance Better Suited for Resolution by the
Political Branches
Even granting the plaintiffs' assumption that climate change is
a significant policy problem, Chief Justice Roberts in his dissent-
ing opinion argued that it was a nonjusticiable general grievance
that should be decided by the political branches rather than by
the federal courts. 2 ' Initially, he asserted that the petitioners' in-
juries from global warming failed to meet Lujan's requirement
that the alleged injury be "particularized" because they were
common "to the public at large."'"' Moreover, he contended that
116. Id. at 545 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 546.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 525-26 (majority opinion).
121. Id. at 535-36, 548-49 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 539-41, 543 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 573-
74 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the Court's lax application of standing principles in this case
failed to consider separation of power principles limiting the judi-
ciary to "concrete cases."123 He argued that the majority's recogni-
tion of standing in a case involving policy issues affecting the en-
tire nation and the world at large caused the Court to intrude
into policy decisions which are only appropriate for the political
branches of government.124 Chief Justice Roberts suggested that
the right of citizens to elect representatives to Congress and a
President was an adequate answer to any sovereign rights that
states had lost when they joined the United States, and, there-
fore, that there was no need for the Court to recognize liberal
parens patriae standing rights for states to raise questions of
quasi-sovereign interests in the federal courts. 25
Justice Roberts's dissenting opinion argued that only the politi-
cal branches should decide issues involving generalized harms
such as climate change, and, accordingly, opposed the majority's
recognition of state standing to bring parens patriae suits to effec-
tuate their alleged quasi-sovereign interests in protecting natural
resources or citizens against generalized harms.' His dissenting
opinion raised broader separation of powers issues about the role
of Congress in establishing constitutional standing boundaries
that the Court has never fully resolved.'2 7 In his concurring opin-
ion in Lujan, Justice Kennedy suggested that Congress has the
authority to define new injuries not recognized by the common
law if Congress utilizes specific language in the statute to define
such injuries."' By contrast, Justice Scalia, in his Lujan opinion,
suggested that there are limits to how far Congress may expand
standing without intruding on the President's authority in Article
II, Section 3 of the Constitution to "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.""' Justice Stevens's majority opinion in Mas-
sachusetts implied that the Court favored Justice Kennedy's ap-
123. Id. at 539-40, 547.
124. Id. at 535-36, 548-49.
125. See id. (arguing the majority usurped the authority of political branches by unduly
expanding standing rights of states).
126. Mank, Standing and Future Generations, supra note 15, at 76.
127. Id. at 76-77.
128. 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(stating that "Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation
that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before," provided that Con-
gress "identiffies] the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate[s] the injury to the class of
persons entitled to bring suit").
129. Id. at 576-77 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 3).
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proach to congressional authority to establish standing even for
generalized grievances by quoting his concurring opinion in
Lujan,"so but the Court did not provide a definitive answer as to
whether states or individuals may achieve standing in such suits
and left that issue to be reargued in AEP."' As a result of the
Massachusetts decision's failure to resolve some of the separation
of powers questions raised in Chief Justice Roberts's dissenting
opinion, the question of whether suits concerning climate change
involve generalized grievances and whether such grievances are
better addressed by the political branches rather than the judici-
ary remained a controversy in the AEP case.13
IV. CONNECTICUT V. AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
IN THE LOWER COURTS
A. The Plaintiffs'Public Nuisance Action
The Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. suit was filed
before the Supreme Court's seminal Massachusetts decision in
2007.2"3 In 2004, two groups of plaintiffs filed separate complaints
in the Southern District of New York alleging that the five de-
fendant electric power companies were committing a public nui-
sance by operating fossil-fuel burning electric generating plants
in the United States that emitted large amounts of carbon dioxide
that significantly contributed to global climate change. 3 4 Eight
Statesl3' and New York City filed the first complaint ("States
Plaintiffs"), and three nonprofit land trusts'3 6 filed the second
complaint ("Land Trust Plaintiffs").' The defendants were four
130. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516 (majority opinion) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
131. See infra Part V.
132. See infra Parts V.B and VI.D.
133. See Am. Elec. Power v. Connecticut, 564 U. S. -, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
134. Id. at , 131 S. Ct. 2533-34.
135. California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and
Wisconsin, although New Jersey and Wisconsin withdrew by the time the case came be-
fore the Supreme Court. Id. at _, 2533 & n.3.
136. Open Space Institute, Inc., Open Space Conservancy, Inc., and Audubon Society of
New Hampshire. Id. at _, 2534 n.4.
137. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267-68 & nn.2-3
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev'd, 582 F.3d 309, 393 (2nd Cir. 2009), rev'd and remanded, 564 U. S.
, , 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2011).
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private companies"' along with the Tennessee Valley Authority, a
federally owned corporation that operates fossil-fuel fired power
plants in several states.'" According to the complaints, the de-
fendants "are the five largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the
United States."'40 Annually, the five utilities collectively emit 650
million tons of carbon dioxide, which constitutes 25% of emissions
from the domestic electric power sector, 10% of emissions from all
domestic human activities, and 2.5% of all anthropogenic emis-
sions worldwide. 4'
In their complaints, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants'
carbon dioxide emissions worsened global climate change and
thereby "created a 'substantial and unreasonable interference
with public rights,' in violation of [either] the federal common law
of interstate nuisance, or, in the alternative, of state tort law." 4 '
The States Plaintiffs alleged that their "public lands, infrastruc-
ture, and [the health of their citizens] were at risk from climate
change."'4 3 The Land Trust Plaintiffs alleged that "climate change
would destroy habitats for animals and rare species of trees and
plants on land the trusts owned and conserved."4 4 Plaintiffs each
sought injunctive relief requiring each defendant "to cap its car-
bon dioxide emissions and then reduce them by a specified per-
centage each year for at least a decade." 4'
B. The District Court Invokes the Political Question Doctrine to
Dismiss the Suits
In 2005, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York dismissed both suits as presenting nonjusticiable political
138. American Electric Power Company, Inc. (and a wholly owned subsidiary), South-
ern Company, Xcel Energy Inc., and Cinergy Corporation, which is now merged into Duke
Energy Corporation. Am. Elec. Power, 564 U.S. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2534 n.5; Cert Peti-
tion, supra note 6, at ii (stating that Cinergy Corporation has merged into Duke Energy
Corporation).
139. Am. Elec. Power, 564 U.S. at_, 131 S. Ct. at 2534.
140. Id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2534 (quoting Joint Appendix at 57, 118, 564 U.S. -, 131
S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 10-174) [hereinafter Joint Appendix]).
141. Id.
142. Id. (quoting Joint Appendix, supra note 140, at 103-05, 145-47).
143. Id. (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 140, at 88-93).
144. Id. (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 140, at 139-45).
145. Id. (quoting Joint Appendix, supra note 140, at 11, 153) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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questions. 146 Invoking separation of powers concerns, Judge
Preska concluded that the complex issue relating to whether and
how to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel burning
power plants was a political question for resolution by the politi-
cal branches and, therefore, not appropriate for judicial deci-
sion."' Relying upon the six-factor test in Baker v. Carr for de-
termining what is a nonjusticiable political question,148 the
district court concluded that a public nuisance suit seeking to re-
duce carbon dioxide emissions from numerous electric power
plants presented a nonjusticiable political question because of
"the impossibility of deciding [the issue] without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.""' The
court reasoned that the plaintiffs' prayer for relief, requiring re-
ductions of carbon dioxide from the plants over several years, was
nonjudiciable because making a decision would
require this Court to: (1) determine the appropriate level at which to
cap the carbon dioxide emissions of these Defendants; (2) determine
the appropriate percentage reduction to impose upon Defendants; (3)
create a schedule to implement those reductions; (4) determine and
balance the implications of such relief on the United States' ongoing
negotiations with other nations concerning global climate change; (5)
assess and measure available alternative energy resources; and (6)
determine and balance the implications of such relief on the United
States' energy sufficiency and thus its national security-all without
an "initial policy determination" having been made by the elected
branches.
146. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005),
rev'd, 582 F.3d 309, 393 (2nd Cir. 2009), rev'd and remanded, 564 U. S. _, _, 131 S. Ct.
2527, 2540 (2011).
147. Id. at 274.
148. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Baker v. Carr established a six-factor test:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a co-
ordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial dis-
cretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolu-
tion without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of the
government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multi-
farious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id.
149. Connecticut, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278
(2003)).
150. Id. at 272-73.
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The court determined that the "identification and balancing of
economic, environmental, foreign policy, and national security in-
terests" is a policy determination properly suited for resolution by
the political branches, and, therefore dismissed the plaintiffs'
complaints."'
C. The Second Circuit Reverses the Decision of the District Court
and Allows an "Ordinary Tort Suit" to Proceed
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the
decision of the district court.152 The case was unusual in that it
was argued in 2006, but was not decided until 2009.'15 The long
delay was likely caused in part by the Second Circuit's postpone-
ment of its decision until the Supreme Court decided Massachu-
setts, which decision the Second Circuit extensively discussed in
its AEP decision."' Additionally, Judge Sonia Sotomayor was a
member of the original three-judge panel of the Second Circuit
until she was elevated to the Supreme Court on August 8, 2009."5
The two remaining members of the panel decided the case on
September 21, 2009, pursuant to a Second Circuit rule on that
subject."
Addressing the threshold jurisdiction questions, the court of
appeals held that the suits were not barred by the political ques-
tion doctrine. and that all the plaintiffs' complaints met the Ar-
ticle III standing requirements.'" The Second Circuit rejected the
district court and defendants' view that the complex issues in-
volved in the case made it a nonjudiciable political question stat-
ing that "federal courts have successfully adjudicated complex
common law public nuisance cases for over a century."" Crucial-
ly, the Second Circuit characterized the plaintiffs' suit as an "or-
dinary tort suit" suitable for judicial -resolution.o The court of
151. Id. at 274 (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278).
152. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2009), rev'd and
remanded, 564 U. S.__ , 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2011).
153. Id. at 310.
154. Id. passim.
155. Id. at 314 n.*.
156. Id. at 310, 314 n.*.
157. Id. at 332.
158. Id. at 349.
159. Id. at 326.
160. Id. at 329, 331.
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appeals acknowledged that Congress by legislation or the execu-
tive branch by appropriate regulations might in the future regu-
late power plant emissions of carbon dioxide and thereby displace
the role of the judiciary under federal common law, but the court
concluded that the political question doctrine did not bar the
plaintiffs' suit because it was similar in its essential nature to
other public nuisance cases that courts had handled in the past,
even if climate change was a new issue."' The Second Circuit's
discussion of standing will be examined in Section D below.'62
Assessing the merits of the case, the Second Circuit held that
all the plaintiffs had stated a claim pursuant to "the federal
common law of nuisance.""' The court of appeals relied on a series
of Supreme Court decisions holding that states may maintain
suits to abate air and water pollution produced by other states or
by out-of-state industry.'64 The court of appeals further concluded
that the Clean Air Act did not "displace" federal common law. The
Second Circuit distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in City
of Milwaukee v. Illinois ('Milwaukee II"), which held that Con-
gress had displaced the federal common law right of action previ-
ously recognized by the Court in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois
('Milwaukee I") by adopting amendments to the Clean Water Act
that comprehensively addressed interstate water pollution, and
thus eliminated any role for federal common law actions address-
ing interstate pollution."' Since the EPA had not yet promulgated
any rule regulating GHGs when it decided the AEP case, the Se-
cond Circuit concluded that the Act did not displace the plaintiffs
federal common law cause of action because "we cannot speculate
as to whether the hypothetical regulation of [GHGs] under the
Clean Air Act would in fact 'spea[k] directly' to the 'particular is-
sue' raised here by Plaintiffs.""
161. Id. at 332.
162. See infra Part IV.B.
163. Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 371.
164. See id. at 350-51 (citing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee ("Milwaukee I"), 406 U.S. 91,
93, 104 (1972) (recognizing federal common law action by Illinois to sue in federal district
court to abate discharge of sewage into Lake Michigan); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206
U.S. 230, 236-38 (1970); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 243 (1901)).
165. Id. at 378-80; City of Milwaukee v. Illinois ("Milwaukee II"), 451 U.S. 304, 316-19
(1981); see 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
166. Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 379-81 (quoting Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Na-
tion, 470 U.S. 226, 236-37 (1985)).
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D. The Second Circuit's Standing Analysis
The district court's decision "explicitly declined to address De-
fendants' standing arguments," reasoning in a footnote that 'be-
cause the issue of Plaintiffs' standing is so intertwined with the
merits and because the federal courts lack jurisdiction over this
patently political question, I do not address the question of Plain-
tiffs' standing."'67 Because it reversed the district court's dismissal
of the case on political question grounds, the Second Circuit found
it necessary to address whether the plaintiffs had standing to
sue.'6 8 The court examined whether the States Plaintiffs had
parens patriae standing and concluded that any uncertainties in
Massachusetts about the relationship between that standing doc-
trine and traditional Article III standing were irrelevant because
the States Plaintiffs met both tests."' The Second Circuit also
discussed whether the States and Land Trusts Plaintiffs had Ar-
ticle III standing in their proprietary capacity as property own-
ers.' The court then applied the three-part Article III standing
test for (1) injury, (2) causation and traceability, and (3) redress-
ability.
Regarding the standing test for injury, the Second Circuit con-
cluded that the States Plaintiffs had adequately alleged current
injury from the reduced size of the California snowpack from in-
creasing temperatures caused by rising levels of carbon dioxide. 7 2
Additionally, similar to the Massachusetts decision, the states al-
so reasonably alleged future injury to their coastal lands from ris-
ing sea levels caused by climate change, despite the defendants'
argument that such injuries were not imminent, because there
was sufficient scientific evidence that rising sea levels would in-
evitably harm the states' coastlines and that such a certain injury
167. Id. at 332 (quoting Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 271
n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev'd 582 F.3d 309 (2009), rev'd and remanded, 564 U.S _, , 131
S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2011)).
168. Id. at 315, 333.
169. Id. at 334-39. The Second Circuit did not address whether New York City had
standing because once the court found that the States Plaintiffs had standing it was not
necessary to decide the standing of the city since only one plaintiff need have standing for
a suit to proceed. Id. at 339 n. 17 (quoting Lumsfield v. Forum for Academic & Institutional
Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006)).
170. Id. at 339-40.
171. Id. at 340-49.
172. Id. at 341-42.
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was imminent even if it might not occur for years.17 ' For the same
reason, the Land Trust Plaintiffs had adequately proven future
harm to their properties from rising sea levels caused by increas-
ing levels of carbon dioxide.174
Following the reasoning in Massachusetts, the Second Circuit
concluded that the defendants' significant contribution to rising
global levels of carbon dioxide was sufficient to establish causa-
tion and traceable injury for Article III standing, even though a
majority of global GHG emissions come from other sources."' The
defendants argued that the plaintiffs had failed to establish cau-
sation because the
Plaintiffs' use of the words "contribute to" is not sufficient to allege
causation, that the multiple polluter cases relied upon by Plaintiffs
are inapposite because causation was presumed by contributions of a
harmful pollutant in amounts that exceeded federally prescribed
limits, and that, in any event, carbon dioxide is not inherently harm-
ful but mixes with worldwide emissions that collectively contribute
to global warming.1 7 6
Rejecting the defendants' arguments against standing for the
plaintiffs, the Second Circuit observed that plaintiffs in public
nuisance cases need merely establish that defendants contribute
to a nuisance to establish causation for standing and, therefore,
the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs needed to demon-
strate something more was unavailing.177
Regarding the redressability prong of the standing test, the de-
fendants argued that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that
their proposed remedy of reducing carbon dioxide emissions from
the defendants' power plants was likely to prevent global warm-
ing.77 The Second Circuit concluded that the defendants' redress-
ability arguments were foreclosed by the Massachusetts deci-
sion.17 ' Following the reasoning in Massachusetts, the Second
Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had demonstrated that it was
likely that a court decision in their favor ordering reductions in
carbon dioxide emissions from the defendants' power plants
173. Id. at 342-44; see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521-23 (2007).
174. Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 342-44.
175. Id. at 345-47; see Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 523-25.
176. Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 345.
177. Id. at 345-47.
178. Id. at 348.
179. Id. at 348-49 (quoting Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 525-26).
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would slow or reduce the pace of global climate change even if it
would not stop it entirely.so
In light of the Massachusetts decision, the Second Circuit's con-
clusion that the States Plaintiffs had standing was understanda-
ble given the similarities in the injuries alleged and commonali-
ties in the causation and redressability in both cases."' More
questionable was the Second Circuit's conclusion that the Land
Trust Plaintiffs had standing since the Massachusetts decision
avoided addressing the standing rights of the private plaintiffs in
that case and suggested that the states had greater standing
rights than private parties; the Second Circuit arguably should
have avoided the thorny issue of standing for the private plain-
tiffs since the remedies sought by the States and Private Land
Trust Plaintiffs were the same.'
V. SUPREME COURT BRIEFS IN AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
V. CONNECTICUT
Because the AEP decision only briefly addressed the issue of
standing and implicitly referred back to the standing issues pre-
sented in the main briefs,' it is especially important to discuss
the three conflicting standing theories presented in the three
main briefs before the Supreme Court. In their brief to the Su-
preme Court, the four private utilities argued that the plaintiffs
lacked Article III constitutional standing to sue, but their argu-
ments directly and indirectly contradicted the standing analysis
in Massachusetts."' In the Tennessee Valley Authority's (the
"TVA") brief, the acting U.S. Solicitor General acknowledged that
at least some of the States Plaintiffs had Article III constitutional
standing in light of Massachusetts, but the brief argued that the
Court should nevertheless deny standing because the plaintiffs'
180. Id. (quoting Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 525-26).
181. See supra Part III.
182. Jonathan H. Adler, The Supreme Court Disposes of a Nuisance Suit: American
Electric Power v. Connecticut, 2010-2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 295, 304-05, 312 n.79 (argu-
ing that the Second Circuit in AEP should not have addressed standing of private parties).
183. See infra Part VI.A.
184. Brief of the Petitioners at ii, 16-29, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S.
-, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 10-174) [hereinafter Petitioners' Brief] (stating that the
four private utilities included American Electric Power Company, Inc., American Electric
Power Service Corporation, Southern Company, Xcel Energy Inc., and Cinergy Corpora-
tion, which is now merged into Duke Energy Corporation, in addition to the Tennessee
Valley Authority); see infra Part V.A.
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claims were barred by prudential standing barriers against judi-
cial resolution of generalized grievances better suited for the po-
litical branches.15 The TVA's generalized grievance argument
against recognizing standing for the AEP plaintiffs, however, is
inconsistent with Massachusetts and other Supreme Court deci-
sions addressing such grievances.' Finally, Connecticut along
with five other states and the City of New York argued that the
States Plaintiffs met both Article III constitutional standing and
prudential tests, especially in light of the Massachusetts deci-
sion.'" As discussed in Part V, four of the justices in AEP ap-
peared to endorse the argument that at least some States Plain-
tiffs had standing, and it is more likely than not that Justice
Sotomayor would do so as well if she were to decide the issue of
standing in a similar case.'
A. The Utilities Brief: No State Standing for Common Law
Claims
In their brief to the Supreme Court, the four private utilities
made three constitutional standing arguments and one pruden-
tial standing argument."' Because the Solicitor General's brief for
the TVA focused on a similar prudential standing argument, this
part will address only the private utilities' three constitutional
standing arguments: (1) the plaintiffs' alleged injuries were not
fairly traceable to defendants' emissions; (2) the plaintiffs' alleged
harms would not be redressed by the relief sought; and (3) the
plaintiffs did not have standing because the standing analysis in
statutory rights cases, including Massachusetts, does not apply in
a case alleging a common law public nuisance.8 o The petitioners'
first two standing arguments would have required the Court to
implicitly overrule Massachusetts, or at least severely narrow the
standing analysis in that decision. Their third argument had a
185. Brief of Tennessee Valley Authority as Respondent Supporting Petitioners at 11-
53, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. -, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 10-174)
[hereinafter TVA Brief]; see infra Part V.B.
186. See infra Part V.B.
187. Brief of Respondents Connecticut, New York, California, Iowa, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and the City of New York at 8-9, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S.
, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 10-174) [hereinafter States Brief]; see infra Part V.C. This
article will not discuss the separate brief of the Land Trusts Plaintiffs.
188. See infra Part VI.
189. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 184, at 16-31.
190. Id. at 16-29.
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small degree of support in the Massachusetts decision, but was
inconsistent with the broader parens patriae reasoning in the
standing analysis in Massachusetts.
1. The Plaintiffs' Alleged Injuries Are Not Fairly Traceable to
Defendants' Emissions
Initially, the petitioners argued that the plaintiffs had failed to
prove a direct causal connection between their carbon dioxide
emissions and global climate change."' According to the petition-
ers, the plaintiffs' theory of harm would allow suits by any entity
alleging harm from climate change against many emitters of
GHGs." 2 Because GHGs are fungible, one can never specifically
trace back a particular harm to a particular emitter."' Additional-
ly, the petitioners argued that the chain of causation alleged by
the plaintiffs was insufficient because the overwhelming majority
of GHG emissions come from independent sources not controlled
by the defendants."'
Prior to the Massachusetts decision, the petitioners would have
had plausible arguments that federal courts should not allow
suits against emitters of GHGs because the harms from such
emissions are too indistinct to trace back to a particular defend-
ant, and because the overwhelming majority of emissions are
from independent sources not named in the suit. The petitioners'
arguments, however, are similar to Chief Justice Roberts's dis-
senting opinion in Massachusetts, where he pointed out that it
was impossible to tease out which climate change harms were
caused by American vehicle emissions as opposed to those from
China or India that are beyond the jurisdiction of American
courts:
Petitioners are never able to trace their alleged injuries back
through this complex web to the fractional amount of global emis-
sions that might have been limited with EPA standards. In light of
the bit-part domestic new motor vehicle [GHG] emissions have
played in what petitioners describe as a 150-year global phenome-
non, and the myriad additional factors bearing on petitioners'
191. Id. at 18.
192. Id. at 19.
193. See id. at 18-19.
194. Id. at 21.
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alleged injury-the loss of Massachusetts coastal land-the connec-
tion is far too speculative to establish causation.'95
The Massachusetts decision rejected Roberts's argument by find-
ing that American vehicles made a "meaningful contribution" to
climate change even if a plaintiff cannot prove how a particular
American vehicle's emissions causes a particular harm from cli-
mate change.196 Similarly, the "meaningful contribution" analysis
in the Massachusetts decision supports the AEP plaintiffs' argu-
ment that they can sue the defendants because they emit a sub-
stantial portion of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions even if they only
contribute 2.5% of global emissions."'
2. The Alleged Harms Will Not Be Redressed by the Relief
Sought
For reasons similar to its argument that the plaintiffs could not
prove causation for standing, the petitioners also argued that the
plaintiffs could not "plausibly allege that the relief they seek will
redress their alleged harms.""' Because the requested injunctive
relief would only reduce the defendants' share of GHG emissions
and would not prevent potentially larger increases from inde-
pendent sources, the petitioners argued that such relief was in-
sufficient for standing because it was not certain to redress global
warming."' While the Massachusetts decision concluded that the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts had met standing requirements
by seeking incremental actions by a regulatory agency to slow or
reduce global warming, the petitioners argued that its case in a
common law action was distinguishable because relief against a
tort defendant must actually redress the plaintiffs injury.o Addi-
tionally, the overwhelming majority of GHG emissions are from
195. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 543-45 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 523-25 (majority opinion); see supra Part III.A.
197. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U. S. _, _, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2534
(2011) (observing that the defending utilities collectively emit 650 million tons of carbon
dioxide, which constitutes "25 percent of emissions from the domestic electric power sector,
10 percent of emissions from all domestic human activities . . . and 2.5 percent of all an-
thropogenic emissions worldwide"); see infra Parts V.A-B (discussing and criticizing peti-
tioners' argument that plaintiffs lack Article III standing).
198. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 184, at 23-24.
199. Id. (citing ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615 (1989)).
200. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992)).
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independent sources that were not parties to the case and reside
outside the United States and its federal jurisdiction.2 0'
While their redressability arguments may have been plausible
before the Massachusetts decision, they were rejected by the ma-
jority and more directly resemble Chief Justice Roberts's dissent.
For example, he complained that the Massachusetts "petitioners
cannot meaningfully predict what will come of the 80 percent of
global GHG emissions that originate outside the United States."202
Because the Massachusetts decision could not address the over-
whelming majority of foreign sources, Chief Justice Roberts con-
tended that the petitioners had failed to prove that their proposed
remedy was "likely" to succeed in preventing harms to Massachu-
setts' coastline.20 The majority opinion in Massachusetts respond-
ed: "While it may be true that regulating motor-vehicle emissions
will not by itself reverse global warming, it by no means follows
that we lack jurisdiction to decide whether EPA has a duty to
take steps to slow or reduce it."204 Even if the AEP petitioners
were correct in asserting that prior tort cases had required a
plaintiff to demonstrate that its proposed remedy will fully re-
dress the alleged harm, the Massachusetts decision clearly en-
dorsed remedies that slow or reduce climate change even if a
remedy cannot address a majority of GHG sources.
3. The Standing Analysis in Statutory Rights Cases, Including
Massachusetts v. EPA, Does Not Apply in Common Law
Actions Like AEP
The Petitioners argued that the Second Circuit erred in follow-
ing the standing analysis in the Massachusetts decision-a statu-
tory case-in AEP, which was a nonstatutory common law case."0
There is a plausible basis for distinguishing the AEP decision
from the Massachusetts decision on the grounds that the latter
decision emphasized that it was "of critical importance" that Con-
gress had "authorized this type of challenge to EPA action,"206 and
no such statutory procedural rights were at issue as a basis for
201. Id. at 24.
202. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 545 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 546.
204. Id. at 525 (majority opinion).
205. See Petitioners' Brief, supra note 184, at 24-25.
206. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516.
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standing in AEP.207 The Massachusetts decision appeared to en-
dorse a congressional role in defining some boundaries of stand-
ing when it quoted Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Lujan,
which observed, "Congress has the power to define injuries and
articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or con-
troversy where none existed before."208 In some circumstances
where Congress has conferred a procedural right in a statute,
courts may relax normal standards for redressability and imme-
diacy,209 but may not relax other constitutional standing require-
ments such as the need for a concrete and particularized injury.210
Yet the Massachusetts decision also emphasized the importance
of giving "special solicitude" to state standing where a state is
protecting its quasi-sovereign interests regarding its natural re-
sources or the health of its citizens.21 ' The reasons for recognizing
special solicitude for state standing in such cases would appear to
apply regardless of whether Congress has conferred procedural
standing in a statute. Justice Stevens's majority opinion in Mas-
sachusetts laid the seeds for future confusion by emphasizing the
separate and potentially contradictory grounds of state parens
patriae standing and statutory procedural standing without ever
explaining which was more important in the case.212 Thus, the
private petitioners' argument that the standing rationale in Mas-
sachusetts should be limited to statutory cases was plausible, but
at least equally plausible was the States Plaintiffs' argument that
states deserved special solicitude in non-statutory cases.21
Additionally, while discussing causation for standing, the Mas-
sachusetts decision observed in passing that "[a]gencies, like leg-
islatures, do not generally resolve massive problems in one fell
regulatory swoop . . . [but] instead whittle away at them over
207. Adler, supra note 182, at 312-13 (distinguishing Massachusetts from AEP on the
grounds that the former case involved standing based on procedural right in statute, but
the latter did not).
208. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)); Peti-
tioners' Brief, supra note 184, at 25.
209. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517-18; see also Petitioners' Brief, supra note 184, at
25.
210. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560); Mank, Informa-
tional Standing After Summers, supra note 15, at 4-5 (stating that a procedural rights
plaintiff must still assert a concrete injury).
211. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518-20.
212. See supra Part III.A.
213. See supra Part III.A. and infra Parts V.C, VI.D.
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time, refining their preferred approach as circumstances change
and as they develop a more nuanced understanding of how best to
proceed."214 The Massachusetts decision's discussion of how agen-
cies solve problems provides possible support for the AEP peti-
tioners' brief in its argument that the statutory analysis in the
Massachusetts decision does not apply to plaintiffs seeking a
common law remedy.21 5 The AEP petitioners in their brief argued
that the common law remedies sought in their case differed from
the statutory ones at issue in the Massachusetts decision because
"[a] court is not a regulator and lacks the discretion of a legisla-
ture to craft 'tentative' remedies designed to 'whittle away' at a
larger problem."216 Nevertheless, the Massachusetts decision's
emphasis on the need for special solicitude for state standing
when states sue regarding their quasi-sovereign interests appears
to be equally applicable in both regulatory and common law cas-
es.' A state's quasi-sovereign interest in protecting its natural
resources under the parens patriae doctrine, as in the Massachu-
setts decision, applies equally in statutory, regulatory, or common
law actions.218 Indeed, the Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. deci-
sion involved a public nuisance suit in which the Supreme Court
applied the parens patriae doctrine to protect a state's natural re-
sources.' Unfortunately, Massachusetts contains language that
can be used to support either side of the standing argument in
AEP.220
In their reply brief, the petitioners emphasized the unprece-
dented nature of the relief sought by the plaintiffs in seeking to
change how the nation generates electricity and argued that
"[t]hese policy judgments should be made by the political branch-
es, not the courts."2 21 The petitioners' argument that courts lack
the authority to address broad issues like climate change through
individualized common law suits is essentially similar to Chief
214. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 524.
215. See Petitioners' Brief, supra note 184, at 26-27.
216. Id.
217. See supra Part III.A. and infra Parts V.C and VI.D.
218. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518-20 (discussing state's quasi-sovereign interest
in natural resources and health of its citizens as justification for parens patriae doctrine);
supra Part III.A.
219. 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
220. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518-19.
221. Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 1-3, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564
U.S. -, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 10-174) [hereinafter Petitioners' Reply Brief].
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Justice Roberts's dissenting opinion in Massachusetts arguing
that generalized grievances can only be redressed by the political
branches and are inappropriate for judicial resolution.222 The
Massachusetts decision, however, concluded that the Court had
standing to hear the case despite the global nature of climate
change and observed "standing is not to be denied simply because
many people suffer the same injury."2 23
To the extent that there should be a distinction between statu-
tory or regulatory actions compared to common law actions,
courts should focus on the merits of a case rather than the pre-
liminary issue of standing.2 24 Courts should deny relief in a public
nuisance action only if regulatory or legislative action has dis-
placed or preempted a tort solution, as the AEP decision partly
did in concluding that the EPA's actions to regulate GHGs dis-
placed any federal common law nuisance actions, rather than
raise an artificial redressability doctrine demanding full redress
when slowing or reducing emissions would at least represent a
partial step forward.2 " While the petitioners' brief sought to dis-
tinguish Massachusetts as involving statutory rights as opposed
to the common law issues in AEP, the petitioners' approach to
standing was far closer to the reasoning of Chief Justice Roberts's
dissenting opinion than the majority opinion in Massachusetts.
The broad approach to state standing pursuant to the parens pa-
triae doctrine in Massachusetts also supported standing in the
AEP decision for at least the state plaintiffs. 227 Accordingly, the
TVA brief acknowledged that at least some of the state plaintiffs
met Article III constitutional standing requirements.22 8
222. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("This Court's
standing jurisprudence simply recognizes that redress of grievances of the sort at issue
here 'is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive,' not the federal courts." (quoting
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992)).
223. Id. at 526 & n.24 (majority opinion).
224. See supra Part II (discussing standing as a preliminary jurisdictional issue).
225. Am. Elec. Power, 564 U.S. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2537-40 (holding EPA's authority
to regulate GHGs displaces any federal common law nuisance remedies sought by the
plaintiffs).
226. Compare Petitioners' Brief, supra note 184, at 14, with Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at
553 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
227. See supra Part III.A (discussing state standing pursuant to the parens patriae doc-
trine in Massachusetts).
228. See TVA Brief, supra note 185, at 25.
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B. The Solicitor General's Brief for TVA: Prudential Standing
Doctrine Bars Generalized Grievances
The Acting U.S. Solicitor General, Neal Katyal, filed a separate
brief on behalf of the federally owned TVA utility as a respondent
supporting the petitioners.229 In contrast to the private petition-
ers' argument that the States Plaintiffs failed to meet the Article
III standing tests for causation and redressability,2 "o the TVA
brief instead argued that, even if some of the States Plaintiffs met
Article III standing requirements, the plaintiffs' common law nui-
sance claims were not justiciable because their suits were gener-
alized grievances more appropriately addressed by the political
branches of the government.23 The United States appeared to in-
voke the prudential standing argument as a way to dismiss the
AEP case without "alter[ing]" the Court's "settled approach ... in
establish[ing] Article III injury."2 2
The TVA argued that the plaintiffs' claims were generalized
grievances because "virtually every person, organization, compa-
ny, or government across the globe also emits [GHGs], and virtu-
ally everyone will also sustain climate-change-related injuries."23 3
The TVA contended that the Court's prudential standing doctrine
barred courts from adjudicating the plaintiffs' generalized griev-
ances in the absence of statutory authorization, especially be-
cause the "EPA, which is better-suited to addressing this global
problem, has begun regulating [GHGs] under the [Clean Air
Act]."'24 Accordingly, the TVA requested that the Court dismiss
the plaintiffs' suits on prudential standing grounds.2 5 Disagree-
ing with the private petitioners, the TVA acknowledged that the
coastal state plaintiffs' allegations of loss of sovereign territory
from rising sea levels caused by climate change were similar to
the allegations in Massachusetts and, therefore, were probably
229. Id. at 5. The TVA is an Executive Branch agency with responsibility for the multi-
purpose development of the Tennessee Valley Region. 16 U.S.C. § 831 (2006). The mem-
bers of its board of directors are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate. Id. § 831a. Furthermore, the TVA is expressly authorized by federal statute to
"produce, distribute, and sell electric power." Id. § 831d(1).
230. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 184, at 30-31.
231. See TVA Brief, supra note 185, at 14.
232. Id. at 21 n.7; see also States Brief, supra note 187, at 24 (discussing TVA Brief).
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sufficient to establish Article III standing under the lenient
standard for surviving a motion to dismiss.23 6
1. Plaintiffs Lack Prudential Standing Because Their Suits are
Generalized Grievances More Appropriately Addressed by the
Representative Branches
The TVA argued that "the principle of prudential standing re-
quires federal courts to refrain from adjudicating 'generalized
grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative
branches."'23 7 The TVA contended that the plaintiffs' common law
allegations were so broad that virtually any landowner or person
in the world could allege similar allegations of harm from climate
change.238 Furthermore, while the plaintiffs only sued a few U.S.
utilities, they could have sued a vast number of other domestic
and foreign industrial, transportation, and agricultural corpora-
tions.2 " The TVA argued that suits potentially implicating ex-
tremely large numbers of potential plaintiffs and defendants
would be better addressed by the representative branches of the
U.S. government than a court, unless Congress had specifically
authorized such suits. 240
Additionally, the TVA brief argued that the plaintiffs' request-
ed relief of having a court issue an injunction requiring the de-
fendants to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions by a specified
percentage each year for at least a decade "would inevitably en-
tail multifarious policy judgments, which should be made by deci-
sionmakers who are politically accountable, have expertise, and
are able to pursue a coherent national or international strategy-
either at a single stroke or incrementally."2 4' The TVA maintained
that Congress had delegated the authority to regulate GHGs to
the EPA in the Clean Air Act, as the Massachusetts decision had
recognized. 242 Especially because the EPA was in the process of
developing and issuing GHG regulations, the TVA brief contend-
ed that prudential standing questions barred courts from ad-
236. Id.
237. Id. at 14 (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 121 (2004)).
238. Id. at 15.
239. Id. at 17.
240. Id. at 15.
241. Id. at 18-19.
242. Id. at 19-20.
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dressing the generalized grievances raised by the common law
claims in the plaintiffs' suit.2 43
The TVA further argued that prudential standing was a more
appropriate and deferential way to end the case because Congress
may override prudential standing considerations, although not
constitutional Article III standing limitations. 24 4 Like the private
petitioners, the TVA sought to distinguish the case from Massa-
chusetts on the grounds that Congress had not provided a statu-
tory authorization for the plaintiffs' claims, and, therefore, pru-
dential standing limitations against generalized grievances could
be invoked in this case even if similarly broad claims were justi-
ciable in the statutorily authorized Massachusetts decision..2 " The
Solicitor General's brief in AEP appeared to invoke the prudential
standing doctrine as a barrier to common law claims while at the
same time respecting Congress's authority to authorize statutory
suits similar to that in Massachusetts.2 46
Observing that the district court in AEP had dismissed the
case under the political question doctrine as not fit for judicial
resolution, the TVA brief argued that the prudential standing
doctrine was a more suitable and narrow method for dismissing
the case as a generalized grievance more appropriately addressed
by the political branches. 247 The TVA brief reasoned that both the
political question doctrine and the prudential standing bar
against courts hearing generalized grievances were motivated by
similar separation of power concerns about the appropriate roles
of the judicial and political branches.2 48 The Solicitor General ar-
gued that the political question doctrine was difficult for lower
courts to apply because the six-factor test in Baker v. Carr could
be interpreted in different ways, and was especially difficult in a
public nuisance case like AEP involving numerous policy issues.249
Accordingly, the TVA brief concluded that it would be easier to
243. Id. at 20-21.
244. Id. at 22.
245. Id. at 23.
246. Id. at 23-24.
247. Id. at 33-39.
248. Id. at 34-35.
249. Id. at 35-39.
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dismiss the case as a generalized grievance under the prudential
standing doctrine than the political question doctrine.250
2. Under Massachusetts v. EPA, At Least Some of the State
Plaintiffs Have Article III Standing in Their Capacity as
Sovereign Landowners
While the TVA brief argued that the Court should deny stand-
ing to the plaintiffs for prudential reasons and not reach constitu-
tional standing issues, it also acknowledged that at least some of
the States Plaintiffs probably had Article III standing in their ca-
pacity as sovereign landowners."25 1 Unlike the private petitioners'
brief, which sought to completely distinguish the facts in AEP
from those in Massachusetts,m' the TVA brief conceded:
Some of the coastal States' allegations of potential injuries here are
materially similar to those that were found sufficient in Massa-
chusetts v. EPA to satisfy the requirements for Article III standing.
While there are differences between that case and this one, the dif-
ferences cut both ways and on balance do not deprive plaintiffs of Ar-
ticle III standing at the pleading stage.
The TVA brief sought to limit the Massachusetts decision to its
facts as a case involving a sovereign state seeking to protect
state-owned land: "The Court's standing analysis in Massachu-
setts v. EPA was carefully limited in two ways. The Court con-
sidered only a single kind of plaintiff (a sovereign State) and re-
lied on only a single kind of injury (the loss of state-owned
land)."" The Solicitor General in the TVA brief appeared to en-
dorse the Massachusetts decision as long as it was "carefully lim-
ited" to sovereign states protecting state-owned land. Accordingly,
the TVA brief conceded that Connecticut and Rhode Island's alle-
gations that they were losing state-owned beach property to ero-
sion from rising sea levels allegedly caused by climate change
were "materially identical" to those in the Massachusetts decision
and therefore met the case's standard for a sufficient injury."'
250. Id. at 39.
251. Id. at 25.
252. See supra Part V.A.
253. TVA Brief, supra note 185, at 25.
254. Id. at 26.
255. Id. at 28.
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While the private petitioners' brief appeared to subtly reject
the Massachusetts decision's approach to standing causation and
redressability by adopting similar reasoning to Chief Justice Rob-
erts's dissenting opinion,2 56 the TVA brief accepted the Massachu-
setts decision's approach to standing causation and redressability
as at least partly applicable to the facts in AEP. The TVA brief
first pointed out factual differences between the two cases:
Unlike Massachusetts v. EPA, this case does not involve a challenge
to a discrete agency action addressing a problem in an incremental
way pursuant to a statutory directive or authorization to proceed in
such a manner. Rather, it is plaintiffs themselves, through their
choice of defendants, who seek to proceed incrementally, and thereby
to have the courts do so in the adjudication of an asserted public nui-
sance under federal common law. The aspect of the Court's rationale
in Massachusetts v. EPA that focuses on the particular authority and
ability of agencies to proceed incrementally therefore is not directly
257
applicable here.
Conversely, the TVA brief found that the reasoning in Massa-
chusetts concerning standing causation "focus[ed] on the amount
of emissions . . . does appear to be applicable to this case."" While
the amount of carbon dioxide emissions allegedly emitted by the
AEP defendants, 650 million tons annually, was roughly one-
third of the emissions at issue in the Massachusetts decision, the
Massachusetts decision's conclusion that the more than 1.7 billion
tons of annual carbon dioxide emissions at issue in that case were
a "meaningful contribution" to global GHG emissions suggested
that the larger amount was probably not the outer limit sufficient
to show causation and, therefore, that the AEP States Plaintiffs'
allegations might well be enough to meet the causation stand-
ard."
Regarding redressability, the Massachusetts decision had rea-
soned that the Commonwealth had met the redressability stand-
ard because its proposed remedy-an EPA issued rule limiting
carbon dioxide emissions-would "slow or reduce" global GHG
emissions.2 " The private petitioners argued that the redressabil-
ity reasoning in a statutory case such as Massachusetts was inap-
256. See supra Part V.A.
257. TVA Brief, supra note 185, at 29.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 29-30 (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 524-25 (2009)).
260. Id. at 30 (quoting Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 525).
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plicable in the AEP States Plaintiffs' common law nuisance action
because in statutory cases Congress may loosen redressability re-
quirements to an extent that courts may not in common law ac-
tion.261 The TVA brief disagreed with the private petitioners' ar-
gument that the AEP States Plaintiffs could not meet the
redressability prong since there was more certainty about re-
dressability in the AEP case than in the Massachusetts decision
"because plaintiffs are not challenging an agency's action or fail-
ure to act to limit emissions by third parties."262 The TVA brief
explained "[p]laintiffs' chains of causation and redressability are
shorter than the ones in Massachusetts, because they seek judicial
relief directly from the entities responsible for the allegedly un-
lawful emissions."
The TVA brief suggested to the Court that at least some of the
States Plaintiffs had met the constitutional standing test.
If the Court agrees that, in light of Massachusetts v. EPA, the coastal
States here have adequately alleged Article III standing at the
pleading stage because, like Massachusetts, they are the owners of
sovereign territory that could be destroyed by rising sea levels asso-
ciated with global warming, then constitutional standing principles
would pose no further barrier to this Court's consideration of wheth-
er the common-law nuisance claims asserted by plaintiffs have been
displaced by the [Clean Air Act] or regulatory actions taken by
EPA. 264
Because only a single plaintiff needs standing for a case to go
forward, the TVA brief did not address whether some of the plain-
tiffs did not meet Article III standing requirements. 5
The private petitioners' arguments that the AEP plaintiffs
could not meet Article III standing requirements for causation
and redressability" and the TVA's argument that at least some
of the States Plaintiffs could meet those requirements2 reflected
differences in their approaches to the Massachusetts decision. The
private petitioners' brief sought to distinguish the AEP plaintiffs'
261. Id. at 30-31.
262. Id. at 31.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 32-33.
265. Id. ("Only one of the petitioners needs to have standing to permit us to consider
the petition for review." (quoting Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518)).
266. See supra Part V.A.
267. TVA Brief, supra note 185, at 25, 28-33.
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common law claims from the statutory claims in the Massachu-
setts decision, but the underlying reasoning in the private peti-
tioner's brief on causation and redressability was closer to Chief
Justice Roberts's dissenting opinion than that of the majority in
the Massachusetts decision.26 8 Although the private petitioners'
brief never called upon the Court to overrule the Massachusetts
decision, if it had adopted the approach of the private petitioners,
the Court in AEP would have effectively overruled or substantial-
ly narrowed Massachusetts. By contrast, the TVA brief appeared
to agree with the reasoning in Massachusetts regarding causation
and redressability, although limiting the case to the facts of a
sovereign state suing to protect its state-owned coastal proper-
ty.2" Accordingly, whether the Court in the AEP case would follow
the standing reasoning of the private petitioners or the TVA was
potentially significant.
C. Connecticut's Brief Massachusetts v. EPA's Standing Analysis
Applies
1. The Plaintiffs' Allegations Suffice to Establish Article III
Standing at this Stage for Injury, Traceability, and
Redressability
Because the TVA brief agreed that at least some of the States
Plaintiffs met Article III standing requirements,270 this Part will
only briefly summarize the States Plaintiffs' constitutional stand-
ing arguments. First, regarding the concrete injury requirement,
the states' brief explained, that: "The States' complaint alleges
two kinds of actual or threatened injuries from global warming:
injuries to the States' own sovereign and proprietary interests,
and injuries to the health and welfare of the States' citizens."2 71
The TVA brief acknowledged that the states' allegations alleging
loss of state-owned beach property from erosion resulting from
rising sea levels caused by climate change were essentially the
same injuries accepted as sufficient for standing in the Massa-
chusetts decision.272
268. See supra Part V.A.
269. TVA Brief, supra note 185, at 25-36.
270. See supra Part V.B.2.
271. States Brief, supra note 187, at 12.
272. See supra Part V.B.2.
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Second, the states' brief argued that their allegations met the
traceability or causation prong of the standing test because the
emissions from the defendants met the "meaningful contribution"
test in Massachusetts."' While the vehicle emissions at issue in
the Massachusetts decision were six percent of global carbon diox-
ide emissions, the emissions from the defendant utilities in AEP
constituted a roughly comparable 2.5%.274 The TVA brief agreed
that the amount of the emissions in the two cases were sufficient-
ly similar.
Third, the states' brief argued that they had sufficiently alleged
that a ruling awarding them injunctive relief would redress their
injuries.2 76 In the Massachusetts decision, the Court did not re-
quire the States' Plaintiffs to prove that their remedy would com-
pletely solve the issue of global warming, but instead concluded
that it was sufficient that the proposed remedy of regulating car-
bon dioxide emissions from new vehicles would "slow or reduce
it." 27 7 Similarly, as the TVA brief conceded, the plaintiffs' proposed
remedy in AEP of gradually reducing carbon dioxide emissions
from the defendants' electric generating power plants would slow
or reduce the global emission of GHGs.27 8 Furthermore, the States
Plaintiffs argued that as parens patriae they were entitled to a
more lenient standard for remedies, as both the Massachusetts
and Tennessee Copper decisions had recognized."
Additionally, the AEP States Plaintiffs argued that their stand-
ing arguments were even stronger than those in Massachusetts
for three reasons. First, Massachusetts involved a petition for re-
view of agency action decided under the more stringent summary
judgment standard rather than the more lenient standard for
plaintiffs in deciding a motion to dismiss, which was the applica-
ble standard in the AEP case.280 In deciding a motion to dismiss,
courts presume that a plaintiffs general allegations are factually
273. States Brief, supra note 187, at 14-16.
274. Id. at 14.
275. See supra Part V.B.2.
276. States Brief, supra note 187, at 16-18.
277. Id. at 16-17 (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525 (2007)).
278. Id. at 17.
279. Id. at 18; see Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519-21; Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206
U.S. 230, 238-39 (1907).
280. See States Brief, supra note 187, at 18-19 (citing Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 514).
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sufficient to establish standing.28 ' Second, in the Massachusetts
decision, the alleged harm resulted not from the defendant EPA,
but from third parties that could be regulated by the defendant.28 2
Usually, standing is more difficult to establish if harm is caused
by a third party.2'3 By contrast, in AEP the defendants were di-
rectly contributing to the problem of GHG emissions and climate
change, and, therefore, the AEP plaintiffs were entitled to a more
lenient standing test than the plaintiffs in Massachusetts.28 4
Third, the AEP case did not raise the same troublesome separa-
tion of powers issues as the Massachusetts decision because the
former case involved only a common law suit against private de-
fendants while the latter decision sought a remedy requiring the
Court to order EPA, a part of the executive branch, to consider
regulatory action."' The AEP plaintiffs contended that standing
to sue in common law cases was "self-evident," unlike suits in
public rights cases in which courts invoke standing as a "gate-
keeping function" to ensure that a plaintiff is the proper party to
challenge the actions of the executive branch or serve as a private
* * *286
attorney general in lieu of agency action.
2. In Light of the States Showing of a Concrete Injury, There
Are No Prudential Limitations that Require Dismissal of the
Case
The brief for the plaintiff states vigorously rejected the TVA's
argument that the prudential standing doctrine barred their
suit. 287 The States Plaintiffs' brief contended that the issue of
whether generalized grievances are suitable for judicial resolu-
tion is an Article III standing issue and not a prudential standing
concern.288 For support, the brief quoted Justice Scalia's concur-
ring opinion in Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc.,
281. Id. at 19 (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168 (1997)).
282. Id. at 20.
283. Id. at 19-20 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992)).
284. Id. at 17-20. The plaintiffs' brief argued that it was irrelevant that most GHG
emissions were from sources that are not parties to the case because, following the Massa-
chusetts decision, their suit would reduce the harm of global warming even if the suit
could not solve the problem. Id. at 20-21 (citing Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 526).
285. Id. at 14, 21-22.
286. Id. at 21-22 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972); CHARLES A.
WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 69 (6th ed. 2002)).
287. See id. at 23-26.
288. Id.at 23.
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where he observed that the Court "has occasionally in dicta de-
scribed the prohibition on generalized grievances as merely a
prudential bar," but he explained that the doctrine "squarely
rest[s] on Article III considerations, as the analysis in Lujan ...
confirms."289 The States Plaintiffs' brief cited other decisions of the
Court agreeing that the issue of whether generalized grievances
are suitable for judicial resolution is an Article III standing issue
and not a prudential standing concern."
Furthermore, the States Plaintiffs' brief argued that their
claims were not generalized grievances even though everyone in
the world is affected in some way by climate change.29 ' The Court
in Akins stated that Article III standing was permissible even if
many people suffered similar injuries as long as those injuries
were concrete and not abstract.29 2 In their brief, the States Plain-
tiffs interpreted Akins as meaning that mass torts are not gener-
alized grievances.' The states argued that their public nuisance
claims were concrete injuries akin to mass torts rather than gen-
eralized grievances and, therefore, rejected the TVA's view that
such widespread injuries are inherently unsuitable for judicial
review. 29 4 The states also argued that states acting as parens pa-
triae to protect the interests of their citizens against public nui-
sances are treated as having a concrete injury for standing pur-
poses, citing a decision of then-Judge Scalia when he was a
member of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia.29 ' Additionally, the author of this article would add that the
Massachusetts decision concluded that the Court had standing to
hear that case despite the global nature of climate change and ob-
served that "standing is not to be denied simply because many
people suffer the same injury."296
289. Id. at 23-24 (quoting Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587,
634 n.5 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)).
290. Id. at 23 (citing Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007); Fed. Election Comm'n
v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1998); Lujan, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992)).
291. Id. at 25-26 (citing Akins, 524 U.S. at 23).
292. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 15,
at 717.
293. States Brief, supra note 187, at 25-26.
294. Id. at 26.
295. Id. (citing Md. People's Counsel v. FERC, 760 F.2d 318, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1985)) ("It
is unquestionable that a state, in its parens patriae capacity, does qualify as personally
suffering some actual or threatened injury.").
296. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 & n.24 (2007).
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More generally, the States Plaintiffs' brief argued that the
Court should not use the generalized grievance doctrine as a
"catch-all" to dismiss "cases involving complex issues that could
arguably be more efficiently or effectively addressed by regula-
tion.""' Congressional authorization in a statute can resolve pru-
dential concerns about whether a case poses a generalized griev-
ance inappropriate for judicial review, but common law suits
involving many potential class members are not automatically
barred by the prudential standing doctrine if they present a con-
crete injury as in Akins.298 If a federal court has jurisdiction over a
case, the States Plaintiffs' brief maintained that federal courts
have a 'virtually unflagging obligation' to exercise their jurisdic-
tion."299 Additionally, the states contended that the TVA's pruden-
tial standing arguments were "indistinguishable from petitioners'
arguments about whether the [Clean Air] Act has displaced the
States' common law causes of action.""oo Additionally, the states'
brief asserted that "TVA's arguments about the purported diffi-
culties in fashioning a remedy here are identical to petitioners'
political-question arguments."' It concluded, "The Court there-
fore should decline TVA's invitation to muddle settled principles
of justiciability with a new prudential-standing test."302 The
States Plaintiffs appear to have convinced four Justices in the
AEP decision that neither the TVA's prudential standing nor the
political question doctrine "bars review.""0o
297. States Brief, supra note 187, at 24.
298. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1998); see also supra Part
I.B.
299. States Brief, supra note 187, at 24 (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist.




303. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. , _, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 n.6
(2011); see infra Parts VI.A. and VI.D.
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VI. THE SUPREME COURT'S FOUR TO FOUR DECISION IN
AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO. V. CONNECTICUT IMPLICITLY
REAFFIRMS AND EVEN EXPANDS MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA'S
STANDING ANALYSIS
A. The Standing Decision in AEP
In almost all cases involving a tie vote, the Supreme Court
simply announces that "The judgment is affirmed by an equally
divided Court."304 The Supreme Court usually follows that formu-
laic response because an equally divided vote simply affirms the
decision below without setting precedent for other lower courts
outside that circuit."' In the AEP decision, however, the Court
took the unusual step of providing some explanation of how it di-
vided on the standing and other jurisdictional questions, although
it did not announce the identities of the Justices who voted for or
against standing.' The Court stated:
The petitioners contend that the federal courts lack authority to ad-
judicate this case. Four members of the Court would hold that at
least some plaintiffs have Article III standing under Massachusetts,
which permitted a State to challenge EPA's refusal to regulate
[GHG] emissions; and, further, that no other threshold obstacle bars
review. Four members of the Court, adhering to a dissenting opinion
in Massachusetts, or regarding that decision as distinguishable,
would hold that none of the plaintiffs have Article III standing. We
therefore affirm, by an equally divided Court, the Second Circuit's
307
exercise of jurisdiction and proceed to the merits.
While technically not binding as a decision for the lower courts
outside the Second Circuit,o8 the AEP decision's four to four af-
firmance of the standing decision provides important clues to how
the Court is likely to rule in future standing cases, at least until
304. Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U. S. _, _, 131 S. Ct. 2312, 2313 (2011) (per
curiam); Koerner, supra note 8 ("Tradition holds that the court's per curiam opinion in
such ties is usually very, very terse often consisting of no more than a single sentence:
'The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided court."').
305. Gerrard, supra note 10 (stating that the standing portion of the AEP case "did not
set precedent in the technical sense"); Denniston, supra note 10 ("Because the Court split
4-4 on the right to sue issue, that part of the Second Circuit decision was left intact, but
without setting a nationwide precedent.").
306. Am. Elec. Power, 564 U.S. at _,131 S. Ct. at 2535.
307. Id. (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520-26, 535 (2007); Nye v. United
States, 313 U.S. 33, 44 (1941)).
308. Gerrard, supra note 10; Denniston, supra note 10.
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the Court's membership changes because of future retirements or
appointments to the Court.
B. Who Were the Four Justices on Each Side of Standing in AEP?
The voting in the Massachusetts decision offers the best guide
to how the eight Justices voted in AEP. Five Justices in the Mas-
sachusetts decision voted that the Commonwealth had standing
under the parens patriae doctrine and general Article III standing
principles: Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer."o' By the time of the AEP decision, Justices Stevens and
Souter had retired from the Court and had been replaced by Jus-
tices Kagan and Sotomayor respectively. 0 Thus, three members
of the original Massachusetts majority remained on the Court for
the AEP decision: Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Be-
cause only four years passed between the two cases and there is
no other evidence that any of the three Justices have radically
changed their views about standing issues, most commentators
have assumed that Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer voted
in favor of standing in AEP, consistent with their endorsement of
broad state standing principles in the Massachusetts decision.'
Justice Kennedy's vote in standing cases is especially im-
portant on the current Court as he has often been the key swing
vote in such cases, most notably in his crucial concurring opinion
in Lujan, which concluded that Congress has the authority to de-
fine new injuries not recognized by the common law if Congress
does so by utilizing specific language in the statute.31 2 During oral
argument in Massachusetts, Justice Kennedy observed that the
309. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 501, 526.
310. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States: Members in the Timeline,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.
aspx (last visited Dec. 12, 2011).
311. Gerrard, supra note 10 ("Though unnamed in the opinion, clearly the four justices
who find standing, and no other obstacles to review, are [Justices] Ginsburg, Breyer, Ka-
gan, and Kennedy.").
312. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgement) ("Congress has the power to define injuries and ar-
ticulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed
before, . . . [provided that Congress] identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the
injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit."); Mank, State Standing, supra note 13,
at 1726 n.128 (discussing crucial swing vote of Justice Kennedy in standing cases). See
generally Charles Lane, Kennedy Seen as the Next Justice in Court's Middle, WASH. POST,
Jan. 31, 2006, at A4 (describing Justice Kennedy as a swing vote on the current Supreme
Court).
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Tennessee Copper decision, which none of the briefs in the case
had addressed, was the "best case" for the plaintiffs, and, there-
fore, the decision's recognition of special state standing rights un-
der the parens patriae doctrine was arguably his idea."' Professor
Gerrard speculates that when the language in the AEP opinion
stating that "[flour members of the Court would hold that at least
some plaintiffs have Article III standing under Massachusetts"314
is "considered in conjunction with Massachusetts," that one might
infer that "Justice Kennedy believes that only states would have
standing. Thus, there might be a 5-4 majority against any kinds
of GHG nuisance claims (and maybe other kinds of GHG claims)
by non-states."""
Four Justices dissented in the Massachusetts decision; joining
Chief Justice Roberts's vigorous dissenting opinion arguing that
standing was inappropriate in that case were Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito.31' These four Justices remained on the Court
at the time of the AEP decision.3 " Again, the most logical pre-
sumption is that these four Justices voted against standing in the
AEP case as they had in the Massachusetts decision.
Justice Elena Kagan, who was nominated by President Obama
and confirmed by the Senate in 2010, was the only member of the
Court who voted in AEP, but was not a member of the Court
when Massachusetts was decided. Commentators have assumed
that she voted in AEP with Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and
Breyer in part because it was unlikely that any of the dissenting
Justices in the Massachusetts decision changed their minds about
standing for the AEP decision.' Furthermore, in her brief time
on the Court, she has generally endorsed a permissive view of
standing for plaintiffs320 and has most often voted with Justices
313. Transcript of Oral Argument at **13, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)
(No. 05-1120), 2006 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 50; see also Mank, States Standing, supra note 13,
at 1738-40 ("It seems most likely that Justice Kennedy suggested that the majority rely
on Tennessee Copper.").
314. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U. S. , _, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535
(2011).
315. Gerrard, supra note 10.
316. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
317. See SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 310.
318. See Gerrard, supra note 10 ("The four who disagree [that there is standing in the
AEP decision] are Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.").
319. See supra note 316.
320. See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. _, _, 131 S. Ct.
1436, 1451-52 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 46:543592
2012] AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO. V. CONNECTICUT
Ginsburg and Breyer.3 1' During the Supreme Court's 2010-2011
term, she voted with Justices Ginsburg and Breyer in 91% and
87% of all cases respectively.3 22 Moreover, she replaced Justice
Stevens, who authored the Massachusetts decision. If in AEP she
had agreed with the four dissenting Justices in Massachusetts, it
is likely that there would be five votes against standing unless
Chief Justice Roberts or Justices Scalia, Thomas, or Alito radical-
ly changed their view of Article III standing in the four years
since Massachusetts. Accordingly, commentators and bloggers
have assumed that Justice Kagan voted for standing in AEP."'
C. How is Justice Sotomayor Likely to Vote on Standing?
Although it is impossible to know for certain, a wide variety of
commentators have speculated that Justice Sotomayor, who was
appointed by President Obama, a Democrat, will probably vote
for standing in a case similar to the Massachusetts decision or the
AEP decision.32 4 In her brief time on the Court, she has also gen-
erally endorsed a permissive view of standing."' Additionally and
more generally, empirical studies have found statistically signifi-
cant differences in judicial voting patterns between federal judges
appointed by either a Democratic or a Republican President, alt-
hough the party of appointment is more significant on average for
some issues than others and not all judges appointed by a partic-
ular party have the same views."' There is conflicting evidence




323. See supra note 318.
324. Adler, supra note 182, at 313 (suggesting Justice Sotomayor would endorse the
approach to standing from Massachusetts or perhaps an even more liberal standard); Ger-
rard, supra note 10 ("Should another case come up on which Justice Sotomayor is not
recused, there might be a 5-4 majority to allow climate change nuisance litigation, but for
the Clean Air Act displacement."); Dan Farber, The Supreme Court on Climate Torts-A
Second Look, LEGAL PLANET (June 30, 2011), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2011/
06/30/the-supreme-court-on-climate-torts-a-second-look/ ("[O]n the standing issue, four
Justices voted to find standing, which almost certainly makes a majority if you add Justice
Sotomayor (who recused herself in this case).").
325. See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org., 563 U.S. at -, 131 S. Ct. at 1450-62
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing, joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, that
taxpayers had standing to challenge Arizona's tuition tax credit); Adler, supra note 182, at
313.
326. See generally FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COuRTS OF APPEALS
22-23 (2007) ('[P]residential ideologies are reflected in the ideologies of their judicial ap-
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about whether the party of appointment affects how federal
courts of appeals judges vote in standing cases,m' and Professor
Cross rightly observes that more empirical data is needed on how
judges vote on procedural issues like standing.328
The predictive power of whether a judge is appointed by a
Democratic or Republican President may have become more pow-
erful with recent Supreme Court appointments as Presidents
more consciously choose judges with a particular ideological
viewpoint. 329 During her time on the Court so far, Justice So-
tomayor has generally voted with the other Justices appointed by
Democratic Presidents.3 "0 For example, the two Justices that Pres-
ident Obama nominated to serve on the Supreme Court, Justices
Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, agreed 94% of the time dur-
ing the 2010-2011 term.3 Justice Sotomayor has also voted con-
sistently with Democratic appointees Justices Ginsburg and
pointees. The Republican appointees were consistently more conservative, on average,
than the Democratic appointees."); CASS SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 11-12, 17-18 (2006) (analyzing 6408
published three-judge federal court of appeals decisions during the 1995-2004 period and
finding statistical significant differences in judicial voting between Democratic and Repub-
lican appointees in several subject areas, but not in other subject areas, including stand-
ing questions). Professor Cross cautions, however, that not all Republican or Democratic
Presidents have the same views as other Presidents of the same party and that judges do
not perfectly replicate the ideologies of the Presidents who appoint them or the Senators
who confirm them. CROSS, supra at 19-20.
327. Compare CROSS, supra note 326, at 185-86 (finding tentative empirical evidence
that Republican judges are more likely to deny standing than Democratic judges), and
Richard J. Pierce, Is Standing Law or Politics, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1742, 1760 (1999),
with SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 326, at 53-54 (finding no statistically significant differ-
ences between Republican and Democratic appointees serving on the D.C. Circuit on
standing issues).
328. CROSS, supra note 326, at 186.
329. For example, President Reagan stated that his goal was to appoint a federal judi-
ciary "made up of judges who believe in law and order and a strict interpretation of the
Constitution." David M. O'Brien, The Reagan Judges: His Most Enduring Legacy? in THE
REAGAN LEGACY 60-62 (Charles 0. Jones ed., 1988). Some Justices in the past broke with
the views of their appointing President. Justice Stevens was appointed by Republican
President Gerald Ford and Justice Souter by Republican President George H.W. Bush, but
both voted more closely with more liberal Democratic appointees. Robert Barnes, The Un-
Routine Sets Apart Sotomayor's First Term, WASH. POST, July 11, 2010, at Al (reporting
that John Oldham McGinnis, a law professor at Northwestern University, characterized
Justice Souter as voting with the conservative wing of the Court during his first year, but
thereafter becoming a reliable liberal vote); Jeffrey Toobin, After Stevens: What Will the
Supreme Court Be Without its Liberal Leader?, NEW YORKER, Mar. 22, 2010, at 39 (identi-
fying Justice Stevens as the leading liberal Justice for many years despite being appointed
by a Republican President).
330. See Barnes, supra note 329.
331. Robert Barnes, Justices Who Will Shape Supreme Court's Future Pair Up, WASH.
POST, June 28, 2011, at A6; STAT PACK, supra note 321, at 19.
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Breyer in 85% and 87% of all the cases during that term.112 Simi-
larly, Republican President George W. Bush's two nominees to
the Court, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito agreed in 96%
of the Court's decisions, and each agreed with two other Republi-
can appointees, Justices Scalia and Thomas in 86% and 90% of
the cases."' By contrast, Justice Sotomayor only agreed with
Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito respec-
tively in 71%, 67%, 68%, and 72% of the decided cases."' In most
cases before the Supreme Court, Republican and Democratic ap-
pointed Justices agree regardless of the party of appointment, but
concerning certain controversial issues there are substantial dif-
ferences. For example, in the Massachusetts decision, where the
generally more "liberal" Justices and "swing-voter" Justice Ken-
nedy voted together to conclude that there was standing and the
more "conservative" Justices disagreed."' If, as is widely believed,
Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, and Breyer were three of the four Jus-
tices who voted in favor of the plaintiffs meeting standing re-
quirements in AEP,"" then it is likely, although not certain, that
Justice Sotomayor would vote for standing in cases similar to
Massachusetts or AEP based on which Justices she is more likely
to agree with. Additionally, she may be influenced by her former
colleagues on the Second Circuit who voted for standing in AEP."'
332. STAT PACK, supra note 321, at 19.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. The dissenting Justices in Massachusetts, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scal-
ia, Thomas, and Alito, generally rank based on their overall voting records as four of the
five most conservative Justices of the forty-three Justices to sit on the Court between
1937 and 2006. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A
Statistical Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775, 781-83 (2009) (ranking the most conservative
to least conservative Justices). According to the Landes and Posner study, Justice Gins-
burg is the ninth most liberal, Stevens the twelfth most liberal, Breyer the thirteenth most
liberal, and Souter the fifteenth most liberal Justice during that time. Id. Justice Kennedy
was the tenth most conservative Justice. Id. By contrast, in Arizona Christian School Tui-
tion Org. v. Winn, which involved the issue of standing for taxpayers challenging Arizona's
tuition tax credit, Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion denying standing, joined by
four conservatives, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice
Alito, while the four liberal Justices-Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan-
dissented and would have granted standing. 563 U.S. _,__ 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1440, 1450-
51 (2011).
336. See supra Part VI.B-C.
337. See supra Part IV.B.
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D. The Impact of AEP on Future Standing Cases
Implicitly, AEP reaffirmed and even expanded the Court's
standing analysis in Massachusetts, which recognized that states
have special standing rights when they sue as parens patriae to
protect their natural resources or the health of their citizens.' In
sum, four Justices concluded that at least some of the AEP plain-
tiffs met Article III standing requirements in light of Massachu-
setts.' Additionally, these four Justices implicitly rejected using
the political question doctrine or prudential standing barriers as
threshold limitations on suits.'
Four members of the AEP Court reaffirmed the broad state
standing doctrine in the Massachusetts decision. The AEP deci-
sion stated: "Four members of the Court would hold that at least
some plaintiffs have Article III standing under Massachusetts,
which permitted a State to challenge EPA's refusal to regulate
[GHG] emissions."3 4' The "some plaintiffs" mentioned by the AEP
decision were probably the States Plaintiffs because the Massa-
chusetts decision only clearly endorsed standing rights for states
to bring suits involving climate change.342
The AEP decision arguably adopted an even broader standing
analysis than Massachusetts by eliminating the requirement of a
statutory procedural right as a basis for standing.343 In their brief,
the private petitioners had argued that the plaintiffs could not
meet the Article III constitutional standing test because the
broad standing principles in Massachusetts were limited to statu-
tory cases.' The petitioners' Article III standing argument, that
the state standing doctrine in Massachusetts was limited to fed-
eral statutory claims, had some support in Massachusetts because
that decision emphasized that the standing rights in that case
338. See supra Part III.




342. See Adler, supra note 182, at 309-10 (suggesting the four Justices in AEP who
stated that at least "some plaintiffs" had standing were most likely referring to the States
Plaintiffs). See generally supra Part II (discussing the Massachusetts decision's "special
solicitude" for state standing rights under parens patriae doctrine).
343. See Adler, supra note 182, at 312-13. See generally supra Part II (discussing Mas-
sachusetts's requirement of a statutory procedural right as a basis for standing).
344. See supra Part V.A.
596 [Vol. 46:543
2012] AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO. V. CONNECTICUT
were based in part on the procedural rights established in the
Clean Air Act.345 The four Justices concluding that some of the
AEP plaintiffs had standing implicitly rejected the argument that
Massachusetts's broad standing analysis applied in only statutory
cases and thus appeared willing to extend Massachusetts's broad
state standing principles beyond its original statutory setting."'
The Massachusetts decision was contradictory in emphasizing
both the importance of the procedural standing rights in the case
and the special standing rights of states. If states really have
special standing status, at least when they sue to protect "quiasi-
sovereign" interests, then why did Justice Stevens's majority
opinion in Massachusetts also put such heavy emphasis on the
procedural right in the case?4 . It is likely that Justice Stevens in
an effort to attract five votes relied on multiple justifications for
standing without deciding or explaining which justifications
should guide future cases.' The AEP decision suggests that, at
least for the four Justices who voted for standing in that case, the
state standing rationale was more important in Massachusetts
than the procedural right rationale."o Thus, though it is techni-
cally not binding on future decisions, the AEP decision might lead
to broader standing rights than Massachusetts. Accordingly, four
Justices appear willing to extend the standing analysis in Massa-
chusetts to common law actions by states.
The four Justices who concluded that at least some of the
plaintiffs had Article III standing also observed that "no other
threshold obstacle bars review.""' In footnote six of the AEP deci-
sion, the Court explained: "In addition to renewing the political
question argument made below, the petitioners now assert an ad-
ditional threshold obstacle: They seek dismissal because of a
'prudential' bar to the adjudication of generalized grievances,
purportedly distinct from Article III's bar."' Thus, four Justices
implicitly rejected the petitioners' argument that the political
345. See supra Part V.A.
346. See Adler, supra note 182, at 313.
347. See supra Part II.A.
348. See supra Part III.A.
349. See supra Part III.A.
350. See supra Part III.A.
351. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. _, _, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535
(2011).
352. Id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2535 n.6 (citations omitted).
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question doctrine barred the plaintiffs' suit."' Furthermore, these
same four Justices implicitly rejected the TVA's argument that
the prudential standing doctrine barred the plaintiffs' suit be-
cause it was a generalized grievance. 54 Implicitly, by concluding
that some of the AEP plaintiffs had standing and that no other
threshold barriers barred their suit, the four Justices refused the
invitations of the petitioners and the TVA to narrow the reach of
the standing analysis in Massachusetts and arguably expanded
standing rights beyond Massachusetts's statutory setting to com-
mon law cases.
VII. CONCLUSION
On the merits, AEP concluded that the EPA's regulatory ac-
tions regarding GHGs displaced the plaintiffs' federal common
law nuisance action." The Court, however, did not decide wheth-
er the EPA's GHG regulations preempted state common law nui-
sance actions and remanded that issue back to the lower courts.5
Accordingly, the issue of standing in state common law public
nuisance actions involving GHGs remains a continuing contro-
versy that may someday be resolved by the Court and is likely to
be faced by the lower courts.
The main impact of the AEP decision on standing doctrine is
that at least four Justices would not limit the Massachusetts
standing doctrine to the facts of that decision or would not use
other threshold barriers to limit state standing.357 Whether the
Court would adopt the petitioners' or TVA's standing or threshold
arguments in future cases depends on how Justice Sotomayor re-
ceives them,3" but at least for now the Massachusetts decision's
broad state standing principles under the parens patriae doctrine
remains valid."'
Implicitly, the AEP Court, by its equally divided vote on stand-
ing, reaffirmed the analysis in Massachusetts, which recognized
that states have special standing rights when they sue as parens
353. See supra Part V.A.
354. See supra Part V.B.
355. Am. Elec. Power, 564 U. S. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2537-40.
356. Id. at_, 131 S. Ct. at 2540.
357. Id. at, 131 S. Ct. 2535 & n.6; see supra Part VI.D.
358. See supra Part VI.C.
359. See supra Part VI.D.
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patriae to protect their natural resources or the health of their
citizens."'o This is an important issue because state attorneys
general are involved in many different kinds of suits in federal
courts.1' State suits are likely to be significant in future common
law nuisance claims regarding climate change.362 Furthermore,
states may challenge the GHG regulations that the EPA plans to
issue in 2012.36'
Like the Massachusetts decision, the AEP decision left unan-
swered whether non-state parties have standing to bring climate
change suits against either the government or private defendants
emitting GHGs. The Supreme Court may someday have to decide
the standing question for non-state plaintiffs. In Native Village of
Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,36 4 the Village of Kivalina, whose
inhabitants are a self-governing, federally recognized Tribe of
Inupiat Eskimos, filed a public nuisance action against several
oil, energy, and utility companies for causing substantial GHG
emissions that contribute to global warming, and alleged that the
defendants' GHG emissions and resulting climate change caused
the melting of sea ice that had protected Kivalina from coastal
storm waves and surges.36 5 The growing storm surges resulting
from climate change have caused erosion that is making Kivalina
uninhabitable.3 66 The plaintiffs allege that, as a result of the ero-
sion, the Village will have to be relocated at a cost estimated to
range from $95 to $400 million. 67 Unlike the AEP plaintiffs who
sought only injunctive relief, the Kivalina plaintiffs seek damages
for the cost of relocating the village.6
In 2009, the District Court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia dismissed the Kivalina case on both political question and
standing grounds. The district court concluded that the political
question doctrine barred the suit because there were no judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for a public nuisance suit
360. See supra Parts III and VI.D.
361. Mank, States Standing, supra note 13, at 1780 (discussing role of state attorneys
general in possible parens patrie cases).
362. Am. Elec. Power, 564 U.S. at_, 131 S. Ct. at 2540.
363. Id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2533.
364. 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
365. Id. at 868-69.
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addressing the complexities of global climate change and also de-
termined that deciding the case would involve policy questions
more appropriately resolved by the political branches of the gov-
ernment.3 " Additionally, the district court concluded that the
plaintiffs could not prove standing causation because they could
not trace the Village's harms to specific actions of the defendants
in emitting GHGs and because any possible connection was too
attenuated to support standing.' The district court rejected the
plaintiffs' assertion that they were entitled to special parens pa-
triae standing rights pursuant to the Massachusetts decision be-
cause "[t]his rationale does not apply to Plaintiffs, which did not
surrender its sovereignty as the price for acceding to the Un-
ion."' Furthermore, the district court concluded:
Even if the special solitude mentioned in Massachusetts applied to
Plaintiffs, they still would lack standing. As discussed above, Plain-
tiffs lack standing on the basis of the political question doctrine and
based on their inability to establish causation under Article III. Even
a relaxed application of the requisite standing requirements would
372
not overcome these fatal flaws in Plaintiffs' case.
The Kivalina case is now on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.73 Because the Village's complaint alleged
not only a federal common law nuisance but also a state common
law nuisance,3 74 the Kivalina appeal remains viable and the Ninth
Circuit probably will have to address the issue of standing in the
case.
The standing portion of the AEP decision is not binding on the
Ninth Circuit in the Kivalina appeal because of the equally divid-
ed vote in AEP.17' Nevertheless, the district court's assertion in
Kivalina that the plaintiffs could not prove causation even if the
special standing rights in the Massachusetts decision were appli-
cable is inconsistent at least with the reasoning of the four Jus-
tices who found standing in the AEP decision.' The private peti-
369. Id. at 873-77.
370. Id. at 877-81.
371. Id. at 882.
372. Id.
373. James R. May, Recent Developments in Climate Change Litigation: Oral Argu-
ments in AEP v. Connecticut and Related Cases, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 111, at 4 &
n.26 (June 9, 2011).
374. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 869.
375. See supra Part VI.D.
376. See supra Part VI.D.
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tioners in their AEP brief made essentially the same argument as
the Kivalina district court decision in arguing that the plaintiffs
could not establish standing causation when the defendants had
caused only a tiny fraction of the worldwide GHG emissions con-
tributing to climate change.' However, four Justices in the AEP
decision concluded that the plaintiffs had met Article III constitu-
tional standing requirements despite similar contrary causation
arguments.' The stronger reasoning in the Kivalina decision is
its conclusion that the state standing doctrine is inapplicable to a
village that never gave up the type of political sovereignty en-
joyed by a state before it joined the United States.' Thus, the
AEP decision casts no light on the standing rights of non-state
plaintiffs."o If Kivalina eventually reaches our highest Court, the
Supreme Court will need to address whether non-state parties
can file suit for harms caused by globalized problems.
It will be interesting to see how lower courts apply the Massa-
chusetts decision in future cases involving standing and GHGs
and whether they cite the AEP decision when they interpret the
former decision."' The AEP decision arguably adopted an even
broader standing analysis than Massachusetts by eliminating the
requirement of a statutory procedural right as a basis for stand-
ing.382 In light of the AEP decision, at least four current members
of the Supreme Court appear to support the standing rights of
states in both statutory and common law actions involving de-
fendants releasing substantial amounts of GHGs, despite the
377. See supra Part VI.A.
378. See supra Part VI.D.
379. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 882.
380. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. _, , 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2536
(2011).
381. See, e.g., Amigos Bravos v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., Nos. 6:09-cv-00037-RB-
LFG, 6:09-cv-00414-RB-LFG, 2011 WL 3924489 (D.N.M. Aug. 3, 2011) (citing Massachu-
setts and AEP and holding that plaintiffs' subjective observations of changes in the New
Mexico climate were too speculative to establish injury from government's approval of
ninety-two oil and gas leases in New Mexico). Additionally, the plaintiffs in this case failed
to prove standing causation because the ninety-two leases would amount to only 0.0009%
of global GHG emissions and that amount did not constitute a "meaningful contribution"
under Massachusetts's test. Id.
382. See supra Parts III.A and VI.D; see also Daniel A. Farber, Standing on Hot Air:
American Electric Power and the Bankruptcy of Standing Doctrine, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE
121, 121-25 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/farber.html (arguing American
Electric Power demonstrates flaws in current standing doctrine because the doctrine is so
incoherent that the Supreme Court could have justified any outcome five Justices desired
and that jurisdictional questions overlapped with the merits of case).
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worldwide source of such emissions.3 " Furthermore, based on her
relatively short record on the Court and the President who ap-
pointed her to the Court, there is some reason to believe that Jus-
tice Sotomayor is more likely to join the four Justices who sup-
ported standing in AEP than the four Justices who concluded
otherwise.14
383. See supra Part VI.D.
384. See supra Part VI.C.-D.
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